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The present master thesis analyses the development and the current 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’ (hereinafter: ECtHR) 
case law. After a brief introduction on the origin of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms1 (hereinafter: ECHR) and the ECtHR, the on-going reform 
process within the ECtHR will be presented. One of the aims of this 
reform process, defined by the Member States of the Council of Europe 
(hereinafter: CoE), is to strengthen the principle of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation doctrine in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The 
objective of this paper is to illustrate if and to what extent the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence has changed in light of the reform process. The case law 
developments will be described based on selected landmark cases. 
                                                          
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
04.11.1950, Rome. (Entry into force 3 September 1953, ETS No. 005).  
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2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Shortly after its creation in 1949 the CoE took up the drafting of the 
ECHR. Adopted in 1950 in Rome, the ECHR originally included a limited 
set of rights to be enforced by the ECtHR but it has been consecutively 
amended through additional protocols.2 
The ECtHR started its first judicial year in 1959. In the original system, 
the European Commission on Human Rights examined the admissibility 
of cases. States as well as individuals alleging violations of the ECHR had 
to pass through the commission to bring a case before the ECtHR. In 
1990, a major change in the original system occurred when Protocol No. 
93 introduced the possibility for individuals to directly bring applications 
before the ECtHR. In 1994, Protocol No. 114 established the court as a 
single permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction and dissolved the 
European commission on human rights.  
Individual complaints today constitute the majority of the court’s 
workload. The judgements of the ECtHR are implemented by the 
concerned signatory states under supervision by the CoE. In the 1990s, 
many former east-bloc countries joined the CoE and thus gained access 
to the ECtHR, enlarging its clientele to around 800 million individuals. 
The enlargement of signatories to the ECHR as well as the possibility for 
individuals to directly bring applications before the ECtHR lead to a 
massive increase in applications, causing a major workload crisis at the 
ECtHR. Currently the court’s yearly input of applications exceeds by far 
its output of decisions.5 
                                                          
2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, The Conscience of Europe. 50 Years of the European Court of 
Human Rights. London, Third Millennium Publishing Limited, 2010, p. 16-23.  
3 Protocol no. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 6.XI.1990. (Entry into force 1 November 1998, ETS No. 155).  
4 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby. 11.V.1994. (Entry 
into force 1 November 1998, ETS No. 5). 
5 See, e.g. H. KELLER/ A. FISCHER/ D. KÜHNE, Debating the Future of the European Court 
of Human Rights after the Interlaken Conference. Two Innovative Proposals, European 
Journal of International Law 2010, p. 2-3. 
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“The reason for the ever increasing backlog [at the ECtHR] are a 
combination of clearly inadmissible applications (more than 90% of all 
applications) and the vast number of applications deriving from the same 
structural cause as an earlier application (repetitive cases).”6  
Although the Court has been able to increase its output in recent years by 
around 25%, problems are far from being solved and a further increase of 
the number of applications is already foreseeable.7 
  
                                                          
6 J.P. RUI, The Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton Declarations. Towards a Paradigm Shift in 
the Strasbourg Court’s Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 2013, p. 31. 
7 L. CAFLISCH, The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights. Protocol No. 14 and 
Beyond, Human Rights Law Review 2006, p. 405.  
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At the Inter-Ministerial Conference held in Rome in 2000 to celebrate the 
50th anniversary of the Convention, the Steering Committee on Human 
Rights (hereinafter: CDDH8) was established to make suggestions for 
reforms of the current system. The CDDH’s suggestions concerning the 
filtering of applications, implementation of the Court’s judgements and 
measures at the national level, were included in its 2003 final report.9 The 
conclusions of this report were integrated into Protocol No. 1410 which 
entered into force in 2010. It contains the following main changes:11 
- Processing Applications of Limited Interest: single judges 
(instead of a three judges committee) can declare applications 
inadmissible. Three judges committees can now decide cases 
unanimously if there is well-established case law of the Court. 
Decisions by single judges and three judge committees are final. 
This change is expected to have a positive effect on the workload 
crisis.  
- Additional Admissibility Criterion: in order to be considered, 
applicants must have suffered a significant disadvantage (de 
minimis praetor non curat). This measure is also intended to help 
to reduce the Court’s workload. 
- Encouragement of friendly settlement 
- Strengthening the system of implementation of Judgements 
 
                                                          
8 CDDH stands for “Comité directeur pour les droits de l’homme”. It is the French name 
of the Steering Committee on Human Rights.  
9 L. CAFLISCH (note 7), p. 407. 
10 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention. 13.V.2004. (Entry into force 
1 June 2010, ETS No. 194). 
11 L. CAFLISCH (note 7), p. 407-412. 
  
5 
A Resolution12 of the Committee of Ministers, published simultaneously 
with the approval of Protocol No. 14 additionally introduced the “pilot-
judgement” technique. The Court therein uses a judgement on a 
representative case caused by a systemic problem in order to issue 
recommendations to the concerned state through the Committee of 
Ministers of the CoE. Until the systemic problem is properly addressed 
within a time limit set by the Court all other cases concerning the same 
issue in the same state are suspended.13 
Despite all these changes aiming at dealing with the caseload crisis, it 
soon became apparent that the measures introduced by Protocol No. 14 
were on one hand necessary to ensure the ECtHR’s “survival” but on the 
other hand by no means sufficient. In order to continue reflections on the 
long-term effectiveness of the ECtHR a “Group of Wise Persons” was 
appointed by the CoE in 2005.14 In 2006, this “Group of Wise Persons” 
released its report,15 containing a number of suggestions that have formed 
the basis of the subsequent reform process of the Convention system.  
In 2010 the High Level Conference on the future of the ECtHR took place 
under the Swiss Chairmanship of the CoE in Interlaken. This meeting 
resulted in a declaration containing an Action Plan, taking up most of the 
measures proposed by the “Group of Wise Persons”. The Action Plan is 
intended to serve as a roadmap for the long-term effectiveness of the 
Convention system.16  
Among others, the Interlaken Declaration reconfirms the importance of 
the right of individual petition, calls for strengthening the ECHR’s 
implementation at the national level and the creation of further filtering 
                                                          
12 Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on judgments revealing an 
underlying systemic problem, adopted on 12 May 2004, 114th Session. 
13 L. CAFLISCH (note 7), p. 413. 
14 H. KELLER et al. (note 5), p. 4. 
15 Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, CM(2006)203, 15 




16 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 32-33. 
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mechanisms, highlights the importance of ensuring quality and 
independence of the ECtHR and expresses the need for improving the 
supervision of the execution of judgments.17 
The Interlaken Declaration also invites the ECtHR not to reconsider 
“questions of fact or national law that have been considered and decided 
by national authorities”18 in light of the fact that it is not a fourth instance 
court. The High Level Conference thus invites the ECtHR to respect its 
subsidiary role vis-à-vis the national authorities within the Convention 
system.  
The Jurisconsult of the ECtHR (i.e. “the person responsible for case law 
monitoring and preventing case law conflicts”19) published a 
comprehensive follow-up note on the Interlaken conference entirely 
dedicated to the principle of subsidiarity20 thus indicating the importance 
of this principle within the current reform process.21  
Within the context of the Convention system, the principle of subsidiarity 
means that “the task of ensuring respect for the rights enshrined in the 
Convention lies first and foremost with the authorities in the Contracting 
States rather than with the Court [ECtHR]. The Court can and should 
intervene only where the domestic authorities fail in that task.”22  
The principle of subsidiarity within the Convention system is thus distinct 
from the principle of subsidiarity as applied and enshrined in European 
Union (hereinafter: EU) law.  
                                                          
17 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Reforming the European Convention on Human Rights. Interlaken, 
Izmir, Brighton and beyond, Directorate General for Human Rights and Rule of Law, 
available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/Publicatio
ns/Compilation%20ReformECHR2014_en.pdf>, 2014, p. 33-38. 
18 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 17), p. 36. 
19 A. BUYSE, New Policy on Reports of Judgments and Decisions (12.06.2012), available at 
<http://echrblog.blogspot.ch/2012/06/new-policy-on-reports-of-judgments-
and.html?m=1>. 
20 JURISCONSULT, Interlaken Follow-Up. Principle of Subsidiarity, 2010, available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-up_ENG.pdf>. 
21 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 33. 
22 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 2. 
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Within the quasi-federal system of the EU, subsidiarity is to be 
understood as “competitive subsidiarity” referring to the competing 
powers of the Union and its Member States in a system where EU law is 
used to further the political integration of the Member States. As the 
ECtHR does not possess supranational decision-making powers, 
subsidiarity within the Convention system is to be understood as 
“complementary subsidiarity” in the sense that the ECtHR only intervenes 
where national authorities are incapable of effectively guaranteeing the 
rights of the ECHR.23  
As the entry into force of Protocol No. 1524 introducing the principle of 
subsidiarity into the preamble is still pending, the principle of subsidiarity 
is not expressly mentioned in the ECHR or its additional Protocols. 
However, it finds its implicit legal basis in different Articles of the ECHR. 
Starting in the late 1960s, the ECtHR also confirmed its subsidiary role 
vis-à-vis the national authorities in its case law and further defined its 
relationship with national authorities.25 
The declarations of the two Interlaken-follow-up high-level conferences 
in Izmir (2011) and Brighton (2012) both took up the principle of 
subsidiarity again and the Contracting States therein expanded their 
wishes towards the ECtHR. While the Izmir declaration invites the 
ECtHR to confirm its subsidiary role in its case law26 the Brighton 
declaration encourages the Court to give great prominence to the margin 
of appreciation of national authorities in addition to the principle of 
subsidiarity.27 Furthermore, the Brighton declaration asks for the 
principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation to 
be included in the Preamble to the ECHR.28 This demanded change of the 
preamble has been included in Article 1 of Protocol No. 15.  
                                                          
23 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 2. 
24 Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 24.VI.2013. (Currently open for signatures).  
25 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 3. 
26 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 17), p. 66. 
27 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 17), p. 93. 
28 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 17), p. 93. 
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In general, the Member States thus seem to call in these declarations for 
greater reluctance by the ECtHR to overturn the interpretations of the 
ECHR carried out by national courts.29 In addition to the aim of ensuring 
the long-term effectiveness this demand is clearly also an expression of 
dissatisfaction of certain Contracting States with a number of unwelcome 
judgments rendered by the ECtHR. By demanding a more subsidiary 
ECtHR they thus also aim at regaining more discretion in their 
decisions.30  
Optional protocol No. 1631 constitutes the latest development in the 
reform of the Convention system and introduces the possibility for the 
highest courts and tribunals of signatory states to request the Court to give 
non-binding advisory opinions on the interpretation of the ECHR.32 
Advisory opinions by the ECtHR on specific cases are intended to help 
national courts and tribunals to avoid potential violations of the ECHR 
and thus also aim to reduce the caseload.  
 
  
                                                          
29 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 37. 
30 See for instance D. SZYMCZAK, Rapport Introductif: le principe de subsidiarité dans tous 
ses états, in F. SUDRE, Le principe de subsidiarité au sens du droit de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme, Droit & Justice nr. 108, Anthemis 2014, p. 36.  
31 Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 2.X.2013. (Currently open for signatures).  
32 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 17), p. 113. 
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4 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY WITHIN 
THE CONVENTION  
As mentioned before,33 the principle of subsidiarity within the 
Convention system means that “the task of ensuring respect for the rights 
enshrined in the Convention lies first and foremost with the authorities in 
the Contracting States rather than with the Court [ECtHR]. The Court 
[thus] can and should intervene only where the domestic authorities fail 
in that task.”34  
Although there is no express mention of this principle in the ECHR or in 
the preparatory documents to the ECHR’s adoption, it is a fundamental 
principle underlying the very structure of the Convention system. 
According to its preamble, the ECHR has been construed to achieve a 
collective enforcement of the rights enshrined in it without taking the 
place of national human rights protection schemes. In the sense of a 
“complementary subsidiarity”,35 national and European human rights 
guarantees go hand in hand.36 
There is also extensive reference to the principle of subsidiarity in the 
ECtHR’s case law, starting with the Belgian Linguistic Case37 in 1968,38 
stating that 
 
                                                          
33 Chapter III Reform Process 
34 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 2. 
35 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 2. 
36 H. PETZOLD, The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity in R.ST.J. MACDONALD/ F. 
MATSCHER/ H. PETZOLD (eds.), The European System For the Protection of Human 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 42-43.  
37 Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in 
Belgium” v. Belgium, apps. nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, 
ECHR 23 July 1968 Reports of Judgments and Decisions, Series A no. 6. 
38 M. O’BOYLE, The Role of Dialogue in the Relationship Between the European Court of 
Human Rights and National Courts in: Y. HAECK/ B. MCGONIGLE LEYH/ C. BURBANO-
HERRERA/ D. CONTRERAS-GARDUNO, The Realisation of Human Rights: When Theory 
Meets Practice. Studies in Honour of Leo Zwaak, Intersentia, 2013, p.92; H. PETZOLD 
(note 36), p. 49.  
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“[…] the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual 
features which characterise the life of the society in the 
State which, as a Contracting Party, has to answer for the 
measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the role of 
the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose 
sight of the subsidiary nature of the international 
machinery of collective enforcement established by the 
Convention. [emphasis added]”39 
4.1 ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY 
Although there is no express reference to the principle of subsidiarity in 
the ECHR, it can still be derived implicitly from the following Articles of 
the Convention: 
- The complementary nature of the Convention system is to be 
found among others in Art. 53 ECHR which ensures that more 
favourable national human rights guarantees shouldn’t be limited 
by the standards set in the ECHR in order to ensure that the more 
favourable guarantee is applied.40  
- Art. 1 ECHR obligates the Contracting States to secure the rights 
and freedoms in Section 1 ECHR to everyone within their 
national jurisdiction. The ECHR thus “lays down standards of 
conduct rather than uniform solutions”41 leaving to each 
Contracting State a spectrum of choices for implementing within 
its own domestic legal order the rights and freedoms of the 
ECHR.42  
 
                                                          
39 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 3. 
40 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 44.  
41 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 44. 
42 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 44; J. CHRISTOFFERSEN, Fair Balance: Proportionality, 
Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights, Martinus 
Nijhof Publishers Leiden 2009, p. 359.  
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- In order to give effect to Art. 1 ECHR, Art. 13 ECHR guarantees 
the right to an effective remedy before a national authority to 
enforce the substance of the Convention rights in whatever form 
they have been implemented in the corresponding domestic legal 
order. As is the case for Art. 1 ECHR, the ECtHR leaves the 
Contracting States broad freedom of choice on how to guarantee 
the effectiveness of remedies for violations of the Convention 
rights under Art. 13 ECHR.43  
- Art. 35 ECHR defines that complaints are only admissible before 
the ECtHR after all domestic remedies have been exhausted in 
order to give states the opportunity to address the complained 
situation before a national court first. However, Article 35 ECHR 
requires a certain degree of flexibility in its application, requiring 
the existence of national remedies to be sufficiently certain in 
order to guarantee an effective remedy.44 
- Art. 41 ECHR provides that just satisfaction to the injured party 
can only be afforded if the Contracting State doesn’t allow for full 
reparation. “Thus, both the remedy [under Art. 13 ECHR] and the 
redress at international level are subsidiary, in that they can come 
into play only in the event of the domestic legal order not having 
fulfilled the primary role assigned to it by the Convention.”45 
4.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY IN THE ECTHR’S CASE 
LAW (PRE 2011) 
The principle of subsidiarity within the Convention system can be divided 
into procedural subsidiarity and substantive subsidiarity. Procedural 
subsidiarity governs the responsibilities for safeguarding the Convention 
guarantees between the ECtHR and national authorities (e.g. Arts. 13 and 
                                                          
43 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 45; J. CHRISTOFFERSEN (note 42), p. 359-360.  
44 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 7. 
45 M. O’BOYLE (note 38), p. 93; H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 48. 
 12 CAHIER DE L’IDHEAP 295 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY WITHIN THE CONVENTION 
35 ECHR). Substantive subsidiarity on the other hand, regulates the 
competency of assessment and review of the ECtHR.46 
Other than the provisions governing the procedural subsidiarity (i.e. Arts. 
1, 13, 35, 41 and 53 ECHR) the principle of subsidiarity is also applied 
concerning the rights and freedoms under section I ECHR in the form of 
the fourth-instance and the margin of appreciation doctrine. However, the 
ECtHR’s use of the principle of subsidiary is limited by the ECHR’s 
guarantee that its rights are effectively applied.47  
Due to its prominence both in the ECtHR’s case law and the declarations 
of the three High Level Conferences, the margin of appreciation doctrine 
will be treated separately (see below under V.)  
The fourth instance doctrine, “as one of the practical manifestations of the 
principle of subsidiarity”,48 posits that the ECtHR “is not a court of appeal 
or a court which can quash rulings given by the courts in the States Parties 
to the Convention or retry cases heard by them”.49 According to this 
doctrine, developed in ECtHR case law, it is therefore not the function of 
the ECtHR to reconsider questions of fact or national law, as is also 
emphasized in the Interlaken Declaration. So-called fourth-instance 
applications are declared inadmissible by the ECtHR, on the ground of 
being manifestly ill-founded according to Article 35 § 3 ECHR.50 Only in 
the event a decision by a national authority is unreasonable, clearly 
arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the 
Convention, the ECtHR may re-examine questions of fact or national 
law.51 Where on the other hand national law is only ambiguous or unclear 
concerning certain measures, and national courts have not resolved this 
                                                          
46 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 6 and H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 49. 
47 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 7. 
48 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 11. 
49 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 9. 
50 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 9-12, M. O’BOYLE (note 38), p. 93 and H. PETZOLD (note 36), 
p. 50-51. 
51 JUDGE D. SPIELMANN, Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human Rights 
and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European 
Review?, Center for European Legal Studies Working Paper Series, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law, 2012, p. 2.  
  
13 
ambiguity, the ECtHR also restrains the scope of the review of 
compliance of this measure with domestic law without imposing a 
solution.52  
The fourth instance doctrine applies in general to all substantive 
provisions of the ECHR and irrespective of the legal sphere53 to which 
the proceedings belong at domestic level. To decide if an application is 
dismissed as a fourth-instance application, the ECtHR proceeds on a case-
by-case basis. A general threshold defining when to dismiss this kind of 
cases hasn’t been established and probably can’t ever be construed.  
In accordance with the fourth instance doctrine, the ECtHR exercises 
judicial self-restraint, particularly regarding factors such as the 
establishment of facts, the interpretation and application of domestic law 
or the admissibility and assessment of evidence before national courts.54 
  
                                                          
52 G. LAUTENBACH, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 82. 
53 The fourth-instance doctrine has been applied among others to civil, criminal and 
taxation cases. JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 11. 
54 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 11-12. 
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5 THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
DOCTRINE 
“The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is a natural product of the 
principle of subsidiarity”55 insofar as it allocates to national authorities 
the discretion to implement Convention guarantees through domestic 
regulations in different areas according to the needs and resources of the 
community and individuals within their territory.56 
According to a definition used by many human rights scholars, the margin 
of appreciation doctrine “refers to the room for manoeuvre the judicial 
institutions at Strasbourg are prepared to accord national authorities in 
fulfilling their Convention obligations”.57  
The margin of appreciation doctrine comes into play when a line is drawn 
between ECHR rights and legitimate public interest limitations. This is 
particularly important when it comes to weighing controversial political 
questions, allowing for equally defensible solutions, as opposed to purely 
technical legal issues. According to the principle of subsidiarity, national 
authorities are in a better and additionally in a democratically legitimised 
position to give answers to such political questions. National authorities 
therefore enjoy a certain margin of appreciation under the supervision of 
the ECtHR.58  
                                                          
55 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 59. 
56 H. PETZOLD (note 36), p. 58. 
57 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, The Margin of Appreciation, Themis competition submission, The 
Lisbon Network, 2008, p.1; ST. GREER, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and 
Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human rights files No. 17, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2000, p. 5; ST. GREER, The Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation?, UCL 
Human Rights Law Review 2010, p. 2; JUDGE D. SPIELMANN (note 51), p. 2. In other 
words, it is “the line at which international supervision should give way to a State Party’s 
discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws”. H. CH. YOUROW, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, p. 21-24; Y. ARAI, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, 
Intersentia, 2002, p. 13. 
58 ST. GREER (note 57) 2010, p. 3. 
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5.1 ORIGIN OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is an essentially judge-made 
doctrine, lacking reference in the ECHR and the drafting documentation. 
Nonetheless, it has been endorsed in over 700 ECtHR judgements by the 
end of the 1990s and is one of the most discussed aspects of the 
Convention system.59 
By its very nature, the margin of appreciation cannot be described by a 
simple formula and despite the amount of jurisprudence and scientific 
literature on the topic “its most striking characteristic remains its 
casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable nature”.60 Due to its vague 
nature, opposing the universal nature of human rights, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine has been subject to extensive criticism, including 
the denial of its legitimacy while other authors underline that it is a 
necessary and legitimate principle of interpretation of the Convention.61 
In 1958, this doctrine has been implicitly applied for the first time within 
the Convention system by the European Human Rights Commission in 
the Greece v. The United Kingdom case concerning a derogation clause 
in time of emergency (Art. 15 ECHR).62 The first express mention of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine coincides with the first inter-state case 
brought before the ECtHR (Ireland v. UK63), also in the context of Art. 
15 ECHR.64 In the subsequent jurisprudence, the margin of appreciation 
doctrine has been extended to other, non-emergency related provisions, 
                                                          
59 P. MAHONEY, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 
Human Rights Law Journal 1998, p. 2; ST. GREER (note 57) 2010, p. 1-2; JUDGE D. 
SPIELMANN (note 51), p. 2. 
60 ST. GREER (note 57) 2010, p. 3; ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 5.  
61 P. MAHONEY (note 59), p. 1.  
62 Greece v. the United Kingdom, (1958-59) 2 Yearbook of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, p. 172-197, app. no. 176/56.  
63 Ireland v. UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, app. no. 5310/71, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions, Series A no. 25. 
64 Y. ARAI (note 59), p. 5-6.  
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including Arts. 5-6 ECHR, Art. 2 of the First Protocol,65 Arts. 8-11 and 
Art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with other Convention Articles.  
The Handyside v. UK66 judgment in 1976 marked an important step in the 
development of the margin of appreciation doctrine.67 The ECtHR therein 
states: 
“48. […] By reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the vital forces of their countries State authorities are 
in principle in a better position than the international judge 
to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ 
or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them. […] Nevertheless, it is 
for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of 
the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion 
of necessity in this context.  
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 leaves to the Contracting 
States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both 
to the domestic legislator (‘prescribed by law’) and to the 
bodies […] that are called upon to interpret and apply the 
laws in force. […] 
49. Nevertheless, Article 10 para. 2 does not give the 
Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The 
Court, which, […] is responsible for ensuring the 
observance of those States’ engagements (Article 19), is 
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10. The domestic margin 
of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European 
supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim of the 
                                                          
65 Protocol I to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 20.III.1952 (entry into force 1 November 1998). 
66 Handyside v. UK, app. no. 5493/72, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions, Series A no. 24, emphasis and underlining added.  
67 Y. ARAI (note 59), p. 8; J. CHRISTOFFERSEN (note 42), p. 247, 251.  
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measure challenged and its ‘necessity’; it covers not only 
the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even 
one given by an independent court. […] 
50. It follows from this that it is in no way the Court’s task 
to take the place of the competent national courts but rather 
to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered in 
the exercise of their power of appreciation. […] [emphasis 
added].”68 
The Handyside v. UK judgment represents the prototype of the analysis 
of the margin of appreciation with respect to the standard “necessary in a 
democratic society”69 as enshrined in Articles 8-11 ECHR and Art. 2 of 
Protocol IV ECHR.70 Furthermore, the doctrine therein is extended to a 
general context, granting national authorities a margin of appreciation in 
balancing individual rights and interests of society as a whole.71  
In the dynamics of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the Strasbourg institutions 
consistently granted relatively wide margins to states in their pre-1979 
case law. Thus, where state discretion was invoked to defend derogations 
from the Convention, the ECtHR only rarely found a violation of the 
ECHR in its early case law. This was particularly the case when a 
European consensus on the matter at hand was lacking.72  
While the Strasbourg organs show a high degree of continuity in the 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in their pre-1979 
jurisprudence mainly concerning Articles 8-11 ECHR, the doctrine has 
been applied to other groups of Articles from 1979 on.73 With growing 
self-confidence, the Strasbourg organs have started affirming their 
                                                          
68 Handyside v. UK (note 66), para. 48-50.  
69 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 9. 
70 Protocol IV to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the 
Convention and in the First protocol thereto, 16.IX.1963 (entry into force 1 November 
1998). 
71 Y. ARAI (note 59), p. 8. 
72 H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 54. 
73 H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 24. 
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supervisory role more assertively from 1979 on and showed “an increased 
willingness to uphold challenges to national [discretion]”.74 This 
development in the ECtHR case law can be explained by the fact that the 
ECtHR considers the Convention as a living instrument that needs to be 
interpreted in accordance with present day circumstances. Arising 
European consensus in different areas and general developments of law 
and social attitudes among ECHR member states thus influence the 
ECtHR’s case law.75  
5.2 GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
DOCTRINE 
The ECtHR typically refers expressly to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in the following four contexts:76  
- Arts. 5-6: Due Process Rights 
The “due process Articles” embrace Articles 5 (right to liberty 
and security) and 6 (right to a fair trial) ECHR. These two 
Articles contain exhaustive lists of situations in which State 
intervention is allowed or of minimal guarantees to be ensured by 
States, thus strongly limiting the States’ margin of appreciation. 
Being “strong” rights, there are only very limited ways for 
Contracting States to justify interferences with these rights with 
their margin of appreciation.77  
- Arts. 8-11: Personal Freedoms  
The personal freedoms Articles encompass Articles 8 (Right to 
respect for private and family life), 9 (Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion), 10 (Freedom of expression) and 11 
(Freedom of assembly and association) ECHR. The margin of 
                                                          
74 H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 56-57. 
75 Y. ARAI (note 59), p. 15. 
76 Y. ARAI (note 59), p. 8-9; for a similar classification see H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 
21-24 or A. LEGG, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law. 
Deference and Proportionality, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 204. 
77 A. LEGG (note 76) 2012, p. 210. 
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appreciation is of particular importance and regularly applied in 
the context of alleged violations of Articles 8-11 ECHR. Each of 
these Articles has the same structure, stating the respective 
freedom in its first paragraph and the corresponding limitation 
clause in paragraph 2. 
- Art. 14: Non-Discrimination  
The ECtHR has repeatedly invoked the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in connection to Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) ECHR, which is only applicable in conjunction 
with another Convention provision thus guaranteeing its 
enjoyment without discrimination on a number of grounds such 
as sex, race or religion. National authorities have repeatedly been 
granted a certain margin of appreciation in determining if a 
difference in treatment is to be classified as a discrimination 
within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR.78  
- Art. 15: Derogation Clause 
As stated before, the margin of appreciation doctrine has first 
been invoked in the context of a derogation of Convention 
provisions in a state of emergency.79 Based on the assumption 
that national authorities are better placed than the Strasbourg 
institutions to determine if Article 15 ECHR applies in a given 
situation (“better position rationale”) the margin of appreciation 
doctrine has been consistently applied in this context.80  
Although certain authors point out that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine could theoretically be applied to any of the Articles of the ECHR 
it has never been invoked in respect to Arts. 2-4 or 7 ECHR.81  
- Art. 2: Right to Life 
Although Article 2 § 2 ECHR provides for exceptions in cases of 
absolute necessity, the margin of appreciation doctrine so far has 
                                                          
78 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 11.  
79 Ireland v. UK (note 63). 
80 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 8. 
81 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 6 and 27.  
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not been applied under this provision due to its fundamental 
nature. The exceptions listed under Art. 2 § 2 ECHR are thus 
different from those in Arts. 8-11 ECHR, which allow for the 
regular application of the margin of appreciation doctrine.82  
- Art. 3: Prohibition of Torture 
Art. 3 ECHR is due to its own wording and that of Art. 15 § 2 
ECHR an absolute right without provisions for exceptions or 
possible derogation during public emergencies under Art. 15 
ECHR.83 “Such a degree of peremptoriness is difficult to 
reconcile with the flexibility inherent in the margin of 
appreciation”.84 Furthermore, the ECtHR notes in its case law that 
no local circumstances of Contracting States can be taken into 
account when applying Art. 3 ECHR.85  
- Art. 4: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour  
In those cases in which the ECtHR dealt with the application of 
Art. 4 ECHR no reference has been made to the margin of 
appreciation as it is an absolute right86 and as the legal 
classifications of slavery and forced or compulsory labour are in 
the exclusive power of the ECtHR.87  
- Art. 7: No Punishment Without Law 
Among the absolute rights of the ECHR not allowing for 
restriction or suspension is also Article 7 § 1 ECHR prohibiting 
convictions for acts or omissions that weren’t considered a 
criminal offence at the time they were committed or the 
imposition of a heavier penalty than applicable at the time the 
criminal offence was committed.88  
                                                          
82 J. CALLEWAERT, Is There a Margin of Appreciation in the Application of articles 2, 3 and 
4 of the Convention?, Human Rights Law Journal 1998, p. 9; ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, 
p. 27. 
83 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 12; JUDGE D. SPIELMANN (note 51), p. 11; see e.g. Saadi v. 
Italy, Judgement of 28 February 2008, app. no. 37201/06. 
84 J. CALLEWAERT (note 82), p. 8.  
85 J. CALLEWAERT (note 82), p. 8 and ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 27. 
86 JURISCONSULT (note 20), p. 12 and ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 27. 
87 J. CALLEWAERT (note 82), p. 9. 
88 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 27. 
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5.3 WIDTH OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
The question of how wide a margin of appreciation should be granted to 
national authorities when interpreting the ECHR is very controversial and 
even debated among ECtHR judges. However, legal scholars have come 
up with the following list of factors generally influencing the margin 
given to national authorities:89 
- The provision invoked: The width of the margin of appreciation 
depends on which type of provision is concerned (due process 
rights, personal freedoms, non-discrimination or the derogation 
clause).  
- The interests at stake: The width of the margin of appreciation 
also depends on the interests at stake, which are of particular 
importance in cases concerning Articles 8-11 ECHR. The ECtHR 
often varies the width of the margin of appreciation by balancing 
private and public interests involved in a case. If a private interest 
goes against an important public interest the margin tends to be 
wider. If an intimate and fundamental private interest is at stake, 
the margin tends to be narrower.  
- The aim pursued by the impugned interference: If an 
interference pursues an aim that has been recognised by the 
ECtHR case law or is listed in the ECHR itself, the margin of 
appreciation will be wider. Such aims include social and 
economic policies and national security concerns.  
- The context of the interference: When determining the margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR usually takes into account the context of 
the interference. Historical contexts in particular, such as periods 
of societal transition, tend to widen the margin given to national 
authorities.  
- The impact of a possible European consensus: If there is a strong 
consensus among the Contracting States on certain issues, the 
margin of appreciation granted to States, which deal differently 
                                                          
89 JUDGE D. SPIELMANN (note 51), p. 9-31. 
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with the issue at hand, will be narrower. Accordingly, where there 
is a diversity of practice and thus no consensus among the 
Contracting States, the margin of appreciation tends to be wider.  
- The degree of proportionality of the interference: When 
assessing the proportionality of an interference with a right, the 
ECtHR examines among others factors the interference’s impact 
on the right, the grounds, the consequences for the applicant and 
its context. A measure impacting negatively on an individual right 
must always be justified by the respondent State and should be 
proportionate to the aim pursued and with no more interference 
than is necessary. The higher the degree of proportionality of the 
interference, the wider the margin of appreciation the ECtHR 
grants.  
- The comprehensive analysis by superior national courts: 
Recently, the ECtHR started to attach considerable weight to the 
comprehensiveness of the proceedings before superior national 
courts. If the restriction in question was thoroughly analysed in 
light of relevant ECtHR case law, the Court requires strong 
reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts and 
thus tends to grant a wider margin of appreciation to the 




6 MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND 
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE IN THE CASE 
LAW 
To analyse the post-2011 ECtHR case law all Grand Chamber judgments 
plus all cases published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions90 
starting from the 01.01.2011 have been screened for their use of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of subsidiarity. This 
selection, including over 90 ECtHR judgments, is intended to feature the 
most important and thus influential decisions taken by the ECtHR. In the 
following section the pre-2011 application of both concepts will be 
described based on the literature on this topic and possible changes in the 
ECtHR’s case law after 2011 will be highlighted.  
The subsequent chapters will follow the same structure for each of the 
considered Articles. In a first section the pre-2011 application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of subsidiarity will be 
described for the Article at hand. The post-2011 judgments that reconfirm 
the pre-2011 application of these concepts will also be treated in the first 
section. In a second section, the post-2011 judgments that represent 
changes in the ECtHR’s case law will be analysed.  
The Articles are grouped as above in “Due Process Rights”, “Personal 
Freedoms” and “Non-Discrimination” and each section on a group of 
rights will close with conclusive remarks on it.  
                                                          
90 The judgments published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions include the most 
important cases, selected by the Bureau (composed by President and Vice-Presidents of 
the Court and of the Section Presidents) following a proposition by the Jurisconsult. 
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6.1 DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
6.1.1 ARTICLE 5 ECHR (RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY) 
Article 5 ECHR defines the circumstances under which arresting and 
detaining an individual is lawful under the Convention. A detention is 
lawful if it is in compliance with national law that must be consistent with 
minimum European standards.  
This “lawfulness” standard, required by each sub-paragraph of Art. 5 § 1 
ECHR, is fulfilled if 
- the arrest or detention is in conformity with substantive and 
procedural rules of national law, 
- its judicial remedy is accessible, foreseeable, sufficiently certain 
and effective 
- the interference with Article 5 ECHR isn’t arbitrary 
- and the continued detention is justified by relevant and sufficient 
reasons.91 
Article 5 § 1 ECHR provides itself an exhaustive list containing six 
legitimate aims of an arrest or a detention92 that need to meet the 
“necessity” requirement. This necessity requirement demands the 
existence of a pressing social need and proportionality with the aim 
pursued.93 Article 5 ECHR enshrines a fundamental right of the 
Convention and the ECtHR therefore exercised strict review of decisions 
of national authorities resembling “a fully matured national appeals 
court”94 in its pre-2011 case law.  
  
                                                          
91 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 30. 
92 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 20. 
93 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57), p. 9.  
94 H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 57 and 176.  
  
25 
In the landmark case Engel95 the ECtHR established the four so-called 
Engel criteria for the analysis of deprivation of liberty. Those criteria are 
the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the 
deprivation of liberty in question.96 
As national authorities are seen to be better placed to assess conditions 
that lead to arrest and detention they were granted a certain margin of 
appreciation in this field in the pre-2011 ECtHR case law.97 Particular 
factors that, according to the ECtHR’s pre-2011 case law, likely widen 
the margin of appreciation under Article 5 ECHR are circumstances that 
involve “military service”, “the evaluation of the mentally-ill” and “the 
need to revoke the parole of recidivists”. General factors widening the 
margin are “considerations of national security or the prevention of 
crime”.98 
In most of the screened post-2011 cases concerning Art. 5 ECHR99 the 
ECtHR reconfirmed the fundamental nature of this provision and either 
did not make or made only marginal reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity or the margin of appreciation doctrine without applying them 
to determine the outcome of the cases. Furthermore, the ECtHR continued 
to apply its thorough scope of review in regards to Art. 5 ECHR given its 
fundamental nature. Among others, the ECtHR confirmed the very strict 
standard concerning the State’s compliance with the “speedily decision” 
                                                          
95 Engel and Others v. Netherlands, Judgment of 8 June 1967, apps. nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 
5102/71; 5354/72 and 5370/72, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, Series A no. 22. 
96 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 41. 
97 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 20, although the ECtHR didn’t apply margin of appreciation 
considerations under Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR before 1979, see E. KASTANAS, Unité et 
Diversité: notions autonomes et marge d’appréciation des Etats dans la jurisprudence de 
la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruylant Bruxelles, 1996, p. 25. 
98 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 21. 
99 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 7 July 2011, app. no. 27021/08; 
S.T.S. v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 7 September 2011, app. no. 277/05; Creanga v. 
Romania [GC], Judgment of 23 February 2012, app. no. 29226/03; Schwabe and M.G. 
v. Germany, Judgement of 1 March 2012, app. nos. 8080/08 and 8577/08, paras. 75-86; 
Idalov v. Russia [GC], Judgement of 22 May 2012, app. no. 5826/03; El-Masri v. The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], Jugdement of 13 December 2012, app. 
no. 39630/09; Del Rio Prada v. Spain [GC], Judgment of 21 October 2013, app. no. 
42750/09; Georgia v. Russia [GC], Judgment of 3 July 2014, app. no. 13255/07; M.A. v. 
Cyprus, Judgment of 23 Octobre 2014, app. no. 41872/10.  
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requirement under Art. 5 § 4 ECHR.100 The strict standard applied can 
also be observed in the fact that the ECtHR didn’t hesitate to assign the 
burden of proof to the respondent government,101 to recognise that it has 
a certain power to review if national law has been observed102 or to 
enforce a strict “quality of law” requirement under Art. 5 § 1 ECHR.103 
With regards to the factors which tended to widen the margin of 
appreciation under Art. 5 before 2011, the ECtHR had to decide two cases 
concerning the detention of mentally ill persons.104 The ECtHR therein 
confirmed its previous jurisprudence. The detention of persons of 
unsound mind has to fulfil three minimum conditions,105 as defined 
among others in Wintwerp v. Netherlands,106 in order to be lawful. These 
three criteria have been taken into account in the two post-2011 cases 
involving the detention of mentally-ill persons.107 When deciding whether 
a person of unsound mind should be detained, States continue to enjoy a 
certain discretion108 without causing a widening of the margin of 
appreciation compared to the ECtHR’s previous case law.109 Both cases 
resulted in the finding of a violation.  
In Hassan v. the United Kingdom110 the ECtHR confirmed that the ECHR 
is also applicable outside of the territory of the Contracting States if they 
exert effective control over the territory in question, as held previously in 
                                                          
100 Idalov v. Russia (note 99), para. 154-158; M.A. v. Cyprus (note 99), para. 160-171; 
S.T.S. v. The Netherlands (note 99), para. 47-50.  
101 Creanga v. Romania (note 99), para. 89, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (note 99), para. 151-153. 
102 Creanga v. Romania (note 99), para. 101. 
103 Del Rio Prada v. Spain (note 99), para. 123-132. 
104 X v. Finland, Judgement of 8 January 2013, app. no. 34806/04; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 
Judgement of 17 January 2012, app. no. 36760/06.  
105 (1) Individuals must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind (2) The mental disorder 
must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement (3) The validity of 
continued confinement must be conditional upon the persistence of such a disorder. 
Winterwerp v. Netherlands, Judgment of 24 October 1979, app. no. 6301/73, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions, Series A no. 33, para 39. 
106 Winterwerp v Netherlands (note 105). 
107 X v. Finland (note 104), para. 149-171; Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104), para. 145-160. 
108 X v. Finland (note 104), para. 150; Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104), para. 155.  
109 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 22-26; E. KASTANAS (note 97), p. 62. 




Al-Jedda111 and Al-Skeini.112 In the Hassan case the ECtHR departed 
from its jurisprudence in Al-Jedda in not finding the detention of a 
prisoner of war in Iraq in violation of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR despite the fact 
that the United Kingdom didn’t rely on a derogation under Art. 15 ECHR 
to justify the detention. The ECtHR, in the words of the four dissenting 
judges, accommodates113 the respondent government as requested by it114 
by disapplying its obligations under Article 5 ECHR in favour of the 
provisions of international humanitarian law (hereinafter: IHL) as 
enshrined in the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention. As this change in 
the case law concerns the reconciliation of IHL and the ECHR and thus 
doesn’t relate to the principle of subsidiarity or the margin of appreciation 
doctrine it will not be considered in more detail.  
6.1.2 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW CONCERNING 
ART. 5 ECHR 
The Austin and others v. UK115 case deals for the first time with the 
question of whether the confinement of a group of people in the 
surroundings of a demonstration within a police cordon for over 7 hours 
amounts to a deprivation of liberty under Art. 5 ECHR. The confinement 
took place at the occasion of an announced anti capitalism and 
globalisation demonstration in London. Based on the experience from 
previous similar demonstration, the police undertook wide-ranging 
preparations, among others the deployment of nearly 6000 police officers 
to ensure public security.  
However, despite careful preparations, the police had been surprised by a 
large crowd of over 1500 people arriving earlier than expected at the place 
of the demonstration, while thousands gathered in the surrounding streets. 
                                                          
111 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom (note 99).  
112 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 7 July 2011, app. no. 
55721/07. 
113 Partly dissenting opinion to Hassan v. The United Kingdom (note 110) of judge Spano 
joined by judges Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjeva, para. 18.  
114 Hassan v. The United Kingdom (note 110), para. 99.  
115 Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 15 March 2012, app. no. 
39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09.  
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In these circumstances, the police decided to impose an absolute cordon 
blocking all exit routes from the area in order to prevent violence, the risk 
of injury to persons and damage to property. Despite several attempts to 
release the confined people, the police was only able to do so 7 hours after 
the cordon has been imposed. The first applicant (Ms Austin) was a 
peaceful protester while the second and third applicants were passers-by.  
A majority of 14 against 3 judges decided that the so-called “kettling” 
crowd-control technique doesn’t amount to a deprivation of liberty. The 
ECtHR started its reasoning by stating that the ECHR is a living 
instrument that needs to be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions, which include new challenges for police forces in the 
Contracting States. Thus, the ECtHR argues that “Article 5 cannot be 
interpreted in such a way as to make it impracticable for the police to fulfil 
their duties of maintaining order and protecting the public [...]”116 
provided the measure in question isn’t arbitrary. In addition, the Court 
found that “[...] the police must be afforded a degree of discretion in 
taking operational decisions”.117 
Then, the ECtHR turned to the question of whether “kettling” amounts to 
a restriction or deprivation of liberty, which according to its case law is a 
question of intensity and not of nature or substance. Before taking into 
account the concrete situation of the case, the ECtHR underlined that, 
according to its case law, the public-interest of a measure has no bearing 
in defining whether a person has been deprived of his liberty.118 
The ECtHR then examined the four Engel criteria of type, duration, 
effects and manner of implementation of the measure to determine if it 
amounts to a deprivation of liberty. It found that the criteria of duration 
and effect of the measure in question “[...] point towards a deprivation of 
liberty”119. However, the ECtHR found that there was “[…] no reason to 
                                                          
116 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 56.  
117 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 56.  
118 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 58.  
119 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 64.  
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depart from the [national] judge’s conclusion [...]”120 that in the 
circumstances the police had neither alternative nor less restrictive means 
at hand to deal with the situation. By taking into account the extraordinary 
context of the case and the lack of alternatives measures, the majority’s 
analysis of the criteria type and manner of implementation led them to 
conclude that the measure did not amount to a deprivation of liberty.121  
Finally, the ECtHR pointed out that the specific context and particular 
facts of any measure always need to be taken into account when deciding 
if it amounts to a deprivation of liberty. Therefore it “[...] cannot be 
excluded that the use of containment and crowd-control techniques could 
[...] give rise to an unjustified deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 5 
§ 1”122 and that the Austin case is thus “exceptional”.123 
The Austin judgment has been heavily criticised by three dissenting 
judges124 and a number of scholars.125 Firstly, the ECtHR’s prominent 
and extensive mention of the principle of subsidiarity126 when applying 
the general case law principles in the Austin case is very unusual in the 
case law relating to Art. 5 ECHR.127  
Despite the fundamental nature of the right to liberty and in contrast to 
the very limited references to the principle of subsidiarity in pre-2011 Art. 
5 ECHR cases, the ECtHR justifies that it doesn’t conduct its own 
assessment of the facts in the Austin case by referring extensively to the 
principle of subsidiarity. The majority’s analysis of the Engel criteria thus 
hasn’t been based on a full assessment of the facts and lacks the thorough 
                                                          
120 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 66.  
121 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 64-66.  
122 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 60.  
123 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 68.  
124 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki in Austin and Others 
v. The United Kingdom (note 115).  
125 Among others see J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 40-41; B. PASTRE-BELDA, La Cour Européenne 
des droits de l’homme – Entre promotion de la subsidiarité et protection effective des 
droits, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 2013, p. 251 et seq.; F. SUDRE, Le 
recadrage de l’office du juge européen, in : F. SUDRE, Le principe de subsidiarité au sens 
du droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Droit & Justice nr. 108, 
Anthemis 2014, p. 256-257. 
126 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 61.  
127 See also B. PASTRE-BELDA (note 125), p. 268 and J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 40-41.  
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and independent review exerted by the dissenting judges as typical for 
Art. 5 ECHR cases.128 Furthermore, the majority states, that “[…] in 
normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from 
the findings of facts reached by the domestic courts”129 which is a novelty 
in Art. 5 ECHR cases. Even though the ECtHR recalls that it is not 
constrained by the findings of facts or legal conclusions of the domestic 
courts as to whether a measure amounts to a deprivation of liberty it 
nevertheless embraces these findings completely. By not conducting a full 
assessment of the facts, as usual in Art. 5 ECHR cases, the majority thus 
acts in a subsidiary manner vis-à-vis the domestic authorities. 
By contrast to the majority opinion, the dissenting judges found in their 
own assessment of the facts that the measure was applied indiscriminately 
in as far as “[…] the police prioritised effectiveness in their operation […] 
by keeping everyone inside the cordon”130 and that this was therefore 
disproportionate. However, the majority opinion applied what some 
authors131 call an outer, procedural approach based on the national court’s 
findings instead of exercising the usual close scrutiny when assessing the 
existence and the proportionality of a deprivation of liberty. Hence, the 
breach with the previous jurisprudence results in the fact that the ECtHR 
subordinates for the first time its own scrutiny to the findings of the 
domestic courts for the sake of the principle of subsidiarity.  
By relying solely on the assessment of the domestic authorities and 
granting them more discretion, the ECtHR reduces the thoroughness of 
its review of the measure in question.  
In addition to the use of the principle of subsidiarity, the dissenting judges 
furthermore criticised that “[…] the majority’s opinion can be interpreted 
as implying that, if it is necessary to impose a coercive and restrictive 
measure for a legitimate public-interest purpose, the measure does not 
                                                          
128 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki (note 124), para. 8 
et seq. 
129 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115), para. 61.  
130 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki (note 124), para. 10.  
131 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 41. 
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amount to a deprivation of liberty”.132 Given, that the ECtHR has never 
taken into account the purpose of a measure in order to define if Art. 5 
ECHR is applicable, it is striking that the majority analysed the four Engel 
criteria in light of the context of the case.133 In the pre-2011 jurisprudence 
the ECtHR only considered the context to assess whether a deprivation of 
liberty was justified under Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. Some scholars go as far as 
to argue that the ECtHR uses the “context” in which action is taken by the 
authorities as a new fifth criterion in the Austin judgment to define if the 
measure in question amounts to a deprivation of liberty.134 By concluding 
that it depends on the context if a measure amounts to a deprivation of 
liberty, the ECtHR thus re-introduces through the backdoor the possibility 
that a Contracting State can present a confinement as a measure required 
by a strong public interest. That way, as was the case in the judgment at 
hand, domestic authorities can now avoid that a confinement is being 
classified as a deprivation of liberty under Art. 5 ECHR. This constitutes 
a strong deviation from the Court’s pre-2011 case law.  
The deviation from its case law is all the more apparent by taking into 
account the 2010 Gillan and Quinton135 case concerning the search of 
passers-by in the context of a demonstration. The ECtHR therein finds: 
“[…] Although the length of time during which each 
applicant was stopped and searched did not in either case 
exceed 30 minutes, during this period the applicants were 
entirely deprived of any freedom of movement. [The 
applicants] were obliged to remain where they were and 
submit to the search and if they had refused they would 
have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and 
criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of 
                                                          
132 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki (note 124), para. 3.  
133 B. PASTRE-BELDA (note 125), p. 267.  
134 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 39.  
135 Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 12 January 2010, app. no. 
4158/05.  
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a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 
1”.136  
As the case was mainly concerned with Art. 8 ECHR, the ECtHR however 
didn’t determine whether the search in question amounted to a breach of 
Art. 5 ECHR. It is nevertheless noteworthy that the element of coercion 
in Austin is, in the words of the dissenting judges, “much higher”, than in 
Gillan and Quinton. The dissenting judges additionally criticised the lack 
of reference to Gillan and Quinton in the Austin judgment.  
In the judgments after Austin, the ECtHR underlined the “exceptional 
circumstances”137 in this case. Additionally, the element of coercion has 
been invoked again in the subsequent M.A. v. Cyprus138 case to find a 
deprivation of liberty in breach of Art. 5 ECHR. In the M.A. v. Cyprus the 
ECtHR referred to the Austin judgment when it held that “[...] the question 
whether there has been a deprivation of liberty is very much based on the 
particular facts of a case”.139 In the Nada v. Switzerland140 judgment the 
ECtHR reconfirmed that the context of a measure is an important factor 
to take into account when deciding if it amounts to a deprivation of liberty. 
By contrast, in Article 2 ECHR cases the Court held that “while remaining 
fully aware of [the] context, the Court’s approach must be guided by the 
[principle that the Convention] requires that its provision be interpreted 
and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective”.141 
Lastly, the ECtHR referred again to the fact that difficulties in policing 
modern societies must be taken into account by granting a certain 
discretion in operational choices and that no impossible or 
disproportionate burden should be put on the authorities in this regard.142 
                                                          
136 Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom (note 135), para. 57. 
137 M.A. v. Cyprus (note 99), para. 192.  
138 M.A. v. Cyprus (note 99), para. 193.  
139 M.A. v. Cyprus (note 99), para. 186.  
140 Nada v. Switzerland [GC], Judgment of 12 Septembre 2012, app. no. 10593/08, para. 
226.   
141 Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom (note 112).  
142 Finogenov and others v. Russia, Judgment of 4 June 2012, apps. no. 18299/03 and 
27311/03, para. 209; Dordevic v. Croatia, Judgment of 24 October 2012, app. no. 
41526/10, para. 139.  
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The case law after the Austin judgment therefore generally seems to 
confirm the new reasoning started therein.  
6.1.3 ARTICLE 6 ECHR (RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL) 
Article 6 ECHR obliges the Contracting States to ensure fair trial in both 
civil and criminal proceedings. More specifically, Art. 6 § 1 ECHR 
contains, in addition to an implicit right of access to courts, the right to a 
fair hearing and the right to trial within a reasonable time. Article 6 § 2 
ECHR enshrines the right to presumed innocence in criminal cases and 
Art. 6 § 3 ECHR includes among others the right to adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of the defence, the right to defend oneself or 
to legal assistance and the right to call and cross-examine witnesses.  
The court consistently held hat the right to a fair trial holds a prominent 
place in a democratic society143 and interpreted the key concepts of 
Article 6 ECHR such as “criminal charge”, “civil rights and obligations”, 
“tribunal” or “witness” as autonomous concepts of the ECHR, granting 
only minimal or no discretion at all to States.144  
Although Article 6 ECHR, as an inherently positive obligation for States, 
permits by implication some discretion as to the means to fulfil this 
obligation, the States’ margin of appreciation therein is to be 
distinguished from that applied in Articles 8-11 ECHR due to its implied 
nature in Article 6 ECHR cases.145  
National authorities enjoy a wide discretion in the choice of means 
designed to ensure compliance with Art. 6 § 1 ECHR, which emphasizes 
the importance of achieving results rather than prescribing means within 
the Convention system.146  
                                                          
143 See among others Jones and others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 June 2014, 
apps. nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, para. 187.  
144 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 7. 
145 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 8; J. CHRISTOFFERSEN (note 42), p. 299.  
146 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 34. 
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6.1.3.1 RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS 
Most of the cases in the ECtHR’s pre-2011 case law involving the margin 
of appreciation doctrine relate to the right of access to courts,147 which 
was first recognised in the Golder148 judgment in 1975. The right of 
access to courts is not expressly defined in Article 6 ECHR but is an 
inherent guarantee inferred from Art. 6 § 1 ECHR. This right is therefore 
subject to limitations permitted by implication.149 However, the ECtHR 
asserts that the guarantee of the right to a court must be both practical and 
effective.150 The ECtHR consistently defended the recognition of the 
margin of appreciation in its pre-2011 jurisprudence on the basis that the 
Member States regulate the access to courts in different ways and that 
there is thus no consensus to be enforced.151 In this regard, the ECtHR 
also made reference to the non-substitution principle, as different 
Contracting States have different social needs among their citizens and 
the national authorities are best placed to assess them.152  
Whether or not national authorities have overstepped their margin of 
appreciation depends on three criteria: 
- The limitation must not restrict or reduce the access in such a way 
or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. 
- The limitation must pursue a legitimate aim.  
- There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.  
 
The notion very essence encompasses the requirements of accessibility 
and foreseeability. This means that the conditions of the access to courts 
must be available and readily accessible for concerned individuals. 
                                                          
147 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 35. 
148 Golder v. UK, Judgment of 21 February 1975, app. no. 4451/70, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions, Series A no. 18. 
149 Golder v. UK, (note 148), para. 36-38; H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 79. 
150 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 36; H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 79. 
151 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 43.  
152 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 43, 47. 
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Furthermore, these conditions need to be sufficiently clear and coherent 
although sometimes requiring the help of a lawyer. The very essence 
requirement is also closely associated or included in the proportionality 
assessment.153  
The Strasbourg organs first exerted self-restraint in examining the very 
essence requirement and then proceeded to more scrutiny in this regard, 
showing a stronger willingness to conduct a stringent proportionality test. 
The Strasbourg organs were effectively taking into account the very 
essence requirement since the late 1990s.154 From the late 1990s on there 
has also been a seemingly deliberate decline in references to the notion of 
margin of appreciation.155  
The proportionality test has been interpreted as requiring a direct, 
necessary and adequate link between the legitimate objective and the 
restriction on the right to access to a court.156  
In four areas, the ECtHR applies judicial self-restraint and grants national 
authorities some discretion in the pre-2011 case law. In cases concerning 
issues of “national security” or policy choices in the field of “national 
fiscal policy” the ECtHR usually broadened the margin of appreciation. 
Where “persons of unsound mind” are involved the ECtHR tended to 
apply a minimalist proportionality standard and a wide margin of 
appreciation. The fourth area where the ECtHR grants some leeway to the 
Contracting States is in the application of “immunity rules” for certain 
categories of public officials.157   
                                                          
153 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 36-37. 
154 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 31-32. 
155 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 42.  
156 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 41.  
157 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 43-46.  
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In the screened post-2011 cases158 concerning the right of access to courts 
the ECtHR reconfirmed its willingness to autonomously interpret key 
concepts such as “civil rights” and even extended guarantees so far only 
granted in criminal law proceedings also to civil proceedings.159 
Generally, the ECtHR confirms that the right to the courts is not absolute 
and may be subject to limitations by implication, granting States a certain 
margin of appreciation as long as the right stays practical and effective.160  
The ECtHR also continued to grant States a certain discretion in cases 
concerning “national fiscal policy” as was the case pre-2011.161  
6.1.3.2 RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 
In addition to the inherent right to access to courts, Art. 6 § 1 ECHR 
enshrines the general right to a fair hearing. The fairness of a hearing is 
measured by the character of the proceedings, the nature of the dispute, 
the manner of dealing with evidence and the public pronouncement of 
judgments.162 As is the case in general for Art. 6 ECHR, the Contracting 
States have a wide discretion as regards the choice of the means calculated 
to ensure that their legal systems are in compliance with the right to a fair 
hearing.163  
Article 6 § 2 ECHR, guaranteeing the right to be presumed innocent, 
enshrines a particular aspect of the right to a fair hearing. It imposes 
requirements in respect of inter alia the premature expressions by the trial 
                                                          
158 Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104); Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], Judgment of 3 April 2012, 
app. no. 37575/04; Segame SA v. France, Judgment of 7 September 2012, app. no. 
4837/06; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, Judgment of 27 May 2013, app. no. 21722/11; 
Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others v. The Netherlands, Decision of 11 June 2013, 
app. no. 65542/12; Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 March 2014, apps. 
nos. 7942/05 and 24838/05;  Jones and others v. The United Kingdom (note 143). 
159 Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey (note 158), para. 76-95.  
160 Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104), para. 229-230; Jones and others v. The United Kingdom 
(note 143), para 186-187; Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others v. The Netherlands 
(note 158), para. 139.  
161 Segame SA v. France (note 158), para. 59.  
162 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 48. 
163 See among others Idalov v. Russia (note 99), para. 174.  
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court or by other public officials of a defendant’s guilt.164 Article 6 § 3 
ECHR enumerates the minimum rights of everyone charged with a 
criminal offence, as another specific aspect of the right to a fair hearing 
under Art. 6 § 1 ECHR.  
The ECtHR examined criminal cases more strictly and closely than civil 
cases pre-2011.  
An area where States were granted some discretion is in the admissibility 
of evidence. This self-restraint is based on the non-substitution principle, 
which lets national courts, presumed to be better placed, to decide what 
evidence to admit while the ECtHR’s role is limited to scrutinising the 
overall fairness of proceedings. Furthermore, the guarantee that 
judgments are publicly pronounced, inherent to the right to a fair hearing, 
has an express limitation allowing restrictions inter alia in the interest of 
morals, public order, national security or where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice. However, this express limitation is to be 
distinguished from the ones in the second paragraph of Arts. 8-11 ECHR 
because restrictions on the public pronouncement of judgments are to be 
applied only in the interests of morals, public order or national security 
and where strictly necessary.165 
Before as well as after 2011, the ECtHR has limited itself to an overall 
assessment of proceedings.166 Furthermore, it consistently held that 
nothing in the letter or spirit of Art. 6 ECHR prevents a person from 
waiving his right to a fair trial as long as this waiver is established in an 
unequivocal manner and attended by minimum safeguards.167 Concerning 
the right to be presumed innocent enshrined in Art. 6 § 2 ECHR, the two 
                                                          
164 Allen v. The United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 12 July 2013, app. no. 25424/09, para. 
93; Karaman v. Germany, Judgment of 7 July 2014, app. no. 17103/10, para. 41.  
165 As opposed to the numerous interests allowing for restrictions listed and the wording 
necessary in a democratic society under the second paragraphs of Arts. 8-11 ECHR. See 
Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 48-51. 
166 Idalov v. Russia (note 99); Margus v. Croatia [GC], Judgment of 27 May 2014, app. no. 
4455/10.  
167 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 49; Idalov v. Russia (note 99), para. 172; Natsvlishvili and 
Togonidze v. Georgia, Judgment of 8 September 2014, app. no. 9043/05, para. 91.  
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post-2011 judgments168 don’t reveal any changes regarding the scrutiny 
applied by the ECtHR.  
6.1.3.3 RIGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
The right to trial within a reasonable time, parallel to the one guaranteed 
under Art. 5 § 3 ECHR, substantiates the importance the ECHR attributes 
to the prompt administration of justice.169 The only post-2011 judgment 
concerning the right to trial within a reasonable time under Art. 6 § 1 
EHCR confirms the ECtHR’s strong and stringent measuring of the 
reasonableness of the length of hearing, leaving national authorities with 
very little if any discretion.170 
6.1.4 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW CONCERNING 
ART. 6 ECHR 
Concerning “immunity rules”, the ECtHR broadened the leeway 
concerning the conditions on the exercise of immunity in its 2014 Jones 
and others v. The United Kingdom171 judgment. In this judgment 
concerning a civil torture claim against a State official, the ECtHR 
extended “State immunity” to include “State officials’ immunity” in such 
cases. It reached this decision having regard inter alia to the lack of 
consensus in public international law and the aim as well as 
proportionality of the granted immunity.172 Furthermore, the ECtHR 
declared inadmissible the complaint of the foundation Stichting Mothers 
of Srebrenica173. This foundation complained that the Netherlands’ courts 
declined jurisdiction to hear their claim against the United Nations 
(hereinafter: UN) for their alleged failure to prevent the Srebrenica 
massacre because of the UN’s immunity.  
                                                          
168 Allen v. The United Kingdom (note 164); Karaman v. Germany (note 164).  
169 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 51.  
170 Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], Judgment of 29 April 2013, apps. no. 32541/08 
and 43441/08. 
171 Jones and others v. The United Kingdom (note 143).  
172 Jones and others v. The United Kingdom (note 143), para 213.  
173 Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others v. The Netherlands (note 158).  
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Following a trend at European level, the ECtHR extended the 
interpretation of Article 6 § 1 ECHR in Stanev v. Bulgaria174 as 
guaranteeing anyone who has been declared partially incapable a direct 
access to a court to seek restoration of his or her legal capacity.175 The 
Court thus narrowed the States’ margin of appreciation regarding cases 
involving “persons of unsound mind”.  
In the Othman v. The United Kingdom176 judgment, the ECtHR for the 
first time found that an expulsion would be in violation of Article 6 
ECHR. The ECtHR decided that the real risk that evidence obtained by 
torture of third persons will be admitted at the applicant’s trial after his 
expulsion amounts to a flagrant denial of justice. In the context of the fight 
against terrorism in which States have a legitimate interest to deport non-
nationals whom they consider to be threats to national security, the 
ECtHR applied a very stringent test of the fairness of a hearing in this 
judgment.177 This is all the more noteworthy as national security grounds 
usually broaden the scope of the States’ discretion.178  
In the 2011 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey179 ECtHR Grand 
Chamber judgment a 10-judge majority granted wide discretion to the 
Turkish authorities. The applicants’ son, an army pilot, died in May 2001 
when his plane crashed in Turkey while transporting troops. The parents 
unsuccessfully applied for the monthly survivors’ pension payable under 
the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act. They applied to the ordinary 
administrative court, which declined jurisdiction, after which their case 
was referred to the Supreme Military Administrative Court, which the 
Jurisdiction Disputes Court adjudged to be competent. For the ordinary 
courts there was a causal link between the crash and the fight against 
terrorism (a necessary condition for the entitlement to the pension in 
                                                          
174 Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104).  
175 Stanev v. Bulgaria (note 104), para. 245. 
176 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 9 May 2012, app. no. 
8139/09.  
177 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (note 176), para. 184, 260.  
178 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 58. 
179 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey [GC], Judgment of 20 October 2011, app. no. 
13279/05. 
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question) whereas the military court found no such link. In the fourteen 
cases brought by the victims’ families of the same plane crash, the 
ordinary administrative courts found a link between the plane crash and 
the fight against terrorism.  
The applicants therefore complained to the ECtHR that two different 
courts came to different conclusions based on the same facts. The majority 
opinion found these conflicting findings not to be in violation of the right 
to a fair hearing under Art. 6 § 1 ECHR based on the non-substitution 
principle and the fact that the Supreme Military Administrative Court’s 
interpretation wasn’t manifestly arbitrary.180 The majority made 
extensive reference to the principle of subsidiarity, stating that it is 
primarily for the national authorities to resolve problems of interpretation 
of domestic legislation and that, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, 
it is not the Court’s role to question their interpretation of domestic law.181 
Furthermore, the majority opinion stated that legal certainty must be 
pursued with due respect for the decision-making autonomy and 
independence of the domestic courts, in keeping with the principle of 
subsidiarity and the fourth-instance doctrine at the basis of the 
Convention system.182  
Another important point in the majority’s reasoning is the fact that the 
conflicting decisions in the present case are linked to the organisational 
structure of the Turkish court system in which (although not expressly 
stated in this judgment) a wide margin of appreciation is granted in order 
not to impose a non-existing European standard.183  
Given the fundamental nature of the principle of legal certainty, the rule 
of law and Article 6 ECHR in general, the ECtHR’s strong self-restraint 
is unusual. The seven dissenting judges accordingly employ a very strong 
wording in their dissenting opinion. They argue that the present case 
constitutes a flagrant malfunctioning of the Turkish judicial system due 
                                                          
180 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179), para. 88- 96.  
181 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179), para. 49-50.  
182 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179), para. 84-88.  
183 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179), para. 68.  
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to the lack of an effective mechanism for harmonising the case law 
between the ordinary and the military administrative courts. They 
furthermore complain that, “if justice is not to degenerate into a lottery, 
the scope of litigants’ rights should not depend simply on which court 
hears their case”.184  
In Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom185 the ECtHR departed 
from its previous position according to which, where a witness cannot be 
cross-examined and the conviction is based on hearsay as the sole or 
decisive evidence, the rights protected under Article 6 ECHR will be 
violated.186 The “sole or decisive” rule thus lost its absolute character. 
The right to call and cross-examine witnesses, as a particularly important 
aspect of the right to a fair trial, is singled out under the minimum rights 
of an accused in criminal proceedings under Article 6 § 3 ECHR. It 
demands that witness statements be made at a public hearing in the 
presence of the accused with a view to adversarial argument. The sole and 
decisive rule is thus to be understood as an exception to the rule that 
hearsay evidence is prohibited in order to ensure the fairness of 
proceedings.  
In contrast to the more general right to a fair hearing under Art. 6 § 1 
ECHR where the ECtHR always restricted itself to examine the overall 
fairness of proceedings, Art. 6 § 3 ECHR calls for a more stringent and 
in-depth examination of the fairness of a hearing. In the 2011 Al-Khawaja 
and Tahery judgment, the ECtHR for the first time allowed national 
authorities the discretion to balance the public and private interests under 
Art. 6 § 3 ECHR. Deviating from its previous case law, the ECtHR limited 
itself to conducting only an overall examination of the fairness of the 
proceedings. Hence, the ECtHR introduced “an exception to what is 
                                                          
184 Joint Dissenting Opinion of juges Bratza, Casadevall, Vajic, Spielmann, Rozakis, Kovler 
and Mijovic to Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179), para. 17.  
185 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 15 December 2011, 
apps. nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06.  
186 Joint partly dissenting and partly concurring opinion of Judges Sajo and Karakas to Al-
Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom (note 185), p. 68.  
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already the exception”187 by allowing counterbalancing factors that are 
not to be evaluated by the ECtHR “so far removed from the trial 
proceedings”188 to relativize the formerly absolute “sole or decisive rule”.  
While some observers189 as well as the concurring judge Bratza190 
acknowledge that the judgment at hand constitutes a change in the 
ECtHR’s case law, they see it as a positive example of a functioning 
dialogue between the ECtHR and domestic courts. They emphasize that 
the new “counterbalancing” approach rightly takes into account national 
safeguards, ensuring the fairness of proceedings and moves away from a 
rigid jurisprudence.  
When looking at this decision not only with regard to the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence but in the wider context of the evolution of the ECtHR’s 
case law since 2011, it constitutes however another example of softening 
up a formerly absolute rule, allowing national courts more leeway when 
applying ECHR provisions.  
6.1.5 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS ON THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Overall, the ECtHR confirmed its strict standards and wide scope of 
review in most of the post-2011 cases concerning Art. 5 ECHR. The Court 
generally made only very limited references to the principle of 
subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in continuation of its pre-2011 
case law. In contrast to this general tendency, the ECtHR accommodates 
in Hassan v. the United Kingdom191 the respondent government by 
disapplying its obligations under Article 5 ECHR in favour of the 
provisions of IHL.  
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188 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom (note 185), para. 154.  
189 J. ELLIOTT-KELLY, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom, European Human 
Rights Law Review 2012, No 1, p. 81 et seq; O. MICHIELS, Le principe de la prevue unique 
ou déterminante, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 2012, No 91, p. 693 et seq.  
190 Concurring opinion of Judge Bratza to Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom 
(note 185).  
191 Hassan v. The United Kingdom (note 110).  
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On the other hand, the reasoning used in the Austin192 judgment 
constitutes a dangerous precedent in regard to the protection of 
individuals regarding their right to liberty as enshrined in Art. 5 ECHR as 
it forsakes said protection in favour of more discretion towards 
Contracting States. By concluding that it depends on the context if a 
measure amounts to a deprivation of liberty and by refraining from 
conducting its own independent assessment of the facts for the sake of 
subsidiarity, the ECtHR thus moved away from the well-established case 
law with consequences yet to be established.  
Regarding Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR found for the first-time a violation 
concerning an expulsion case in Othman v. The United Kingdom193 and a 
majority of judgments confirmed prevalent case law. However, the 
ECtHR awarded unusual discretion to national authorities in two cases. In 
Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey194 the ECtHR abstained in the 
name of subsidiarity from enforcing legal certainty endangered by the 
very nature of the organisational structure of the Turkish court system. In 
Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom195 the ECtHR abandoned 
for the first time the “sole or decisive rule” protecting defendants against 
hearsay evidence and ensuring a fair trial.  
Considering the above findings one can observe a clear development of 
the ECtHR’s case law towards more subsidiarity. Within this tendency 
the ECtHR did not refrain from deviating from well-established case law 
and to soften up strict concepts.  
6.2 ARTS. 8-11: PERSONAL FREEDOMS 
The personal freedoms enshrined in Arts. 8-11 ECHR all share the same 
structure. In the first paragraph of each of these articles the rights 
                                                          
192 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115). 
193 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (note 176).  
194 Nejdet Sahin and Perihan Sahin v. Turkey (note 179). 
195 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom (note 185). 
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guaranteed are defined and the second paragraph lies down under which 
conditions an interference with these rights is justified.196  
An interference with the guarantees under Arts. 8-11 ECHR is unjustified 
unless it is: 
1) in “accordance with the law”, 
2) has a “legitimate aim” and 
3) is “necessary in a democratic society”.197  
 
The “in accordance with the law” requirement asks that the measure in 
question should have a legal basis in domestic law. However, it also refers 
to the quality of the law in question and requires the law to be accessible 
to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects.198   
The “legitimate aims” capable of justifying an interference with the 
guarantees are exhaustively listed under the respective second paragraph 
of Arts. 8-11 ECHR.  
In the 1983 Silver and Others v. UK judgment199, the ECtHR enumerated 
the following four principles inherent to the “necessary in a democratic 
society” requirement.  
1) The adjective “necessary” is not synonymous with 
“indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions 
as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or 
“desirable”. 
2) The Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin 
of appreciation in the matter of the imposition of restrictions, but 
                                                          
196 ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 9; COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 4.  
197 C. OVEY, The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention, Human Rights 
Law Journal 1998, p. 10.  
198 See among others Mennesson v. France, Judgment of 26 June 2014, app. no. 65192/11, 
para. 57; Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 61-62. 
199 Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983, apps. nos. 
5947/72, 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions, Series A no. 61. 
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it is for the ECtHR to give the final ruling on whether they are 
compatible with the ECHR. 
3) The phrase “necessary in a democratic society” means that, to be 
compatible with the Convention, the interference must, inter 
alia, correspond to a “pressing social need” and be 
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.  
4) Those paragraphs of Articles of the ECHR, which provide for an 
exception to a right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted.200  
 
The breadth of the margin generally depends on a number of factors 
including the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for 
the individual, the nature of the interference and the object pursued by the 
interference.201 In addition, the reasons brought forward by States to 
justify interferences with the personal freedoms need to be both 
“relevant” and “sufficient”.202  
As a general rule, where there is a consensus within the Member States of 
the Council of Europe or where States have to undertake a balancing 
exercise between competing private and public interests or different 
Convention rights their margin of appreciation tends to be wider pre-
2011. The choice how to ensure their positive and negative obligations 
generally also falls within the margin of appreciation of the Contracting 
States.203  
In a first period of case law between the ECtHR’s foundation and 1979, 
the Court usually granted a margin of appreciation when Contracting 
States asked for it. After that, the ECtHR was more assertive in its 
jurisprudence and exerted a stronger review in the personal freedom 
Articles.204  
                                                          
200 Silver and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 199), para. 97.  
201 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 4. 
202 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 61-63. 
203 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 85. 
204 H. CH. YOUROW (note 57), p. 180. 
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6.2.1 ARTICLE 8 (RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE) 
Article 8 ECHR protects the right to respect for one’s private and family 
life, one’s home and correspondence. Under this provision, States have 
both a negative obligation not to interfere with the rights enshrined and a 
positive obligation to guarantee effective enjoyment of these rights.205 For 
both negative and positive obligations the ECtHR allows a certain, but not 
unlimited, margin of appreciation. The choice how to ensure the positive 
and negative obligations however falls within the margin of appreciation 
of the Contracting States.206  
The “legitimate aims” capable of justifying an interference with the 
guarantees under Art. 8 ECHR comprise interests of national security, 
public safety, the economic wellbeing of the country, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.  
In the pre-2011 case law the ECtHR has been willing to grant a certain 
discretion in a number of particular fields where national authorities 
traditionally enjoy a margin of appreciation. For instance in the field of 
“family relationships” - where the ECtHR mainly deals with issues such 
as access to, custody and adoption of children or the treatment of children 
born out of wedlock - the tendency has been to give a wide margin of 
appreciation to the national authorities in assessing the best interests of 
children. In the fields of issues concerning “homosexuals” and 
“transsexuals” the ECtHR showed restraint to impose standards and 
granted a wide discretion to national authorities to regulate issues such as 
the recognition of a post-operative transsexual or the recognition of 
family and marriage of homosexual persons. Concerning the “rights of 
prisoners” to family life, the ECtHR grants the Contracting States wide 
discretion in organising their penitentiary system because of the 
underlying public safety considerations.207 Considerations of morals, 
                                                          
205 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 60; A. LEGG (note 76), p. 211-212; C. OVEY (note 197), p. 10.  
206 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 85. 
207 C. OVEY (note 197), p. 11-12; Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 63-82. 
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national security and the prevention of disorder or crime are general 
policy grounds that tend to widen the accorded margin of appreciation.208 
Where a particularly important facet or an essential aspect of an 
individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin of appreciation 
allowed to the State will be restricted.209  
In the screened post-2011 cases210 the ECtHR continues to narrow the 
accorded margin of appreciation where an essential aspect of an 
individual’s identity is at stake or where a corresponding European 
consensus exists.211 The 2011 S.H. and Others v. Austria judgment212 is 
an example where the ECtHR had to balance a lacking European 
consensus concerning artificial procreation (which is in addition a 
sensitive moral and ethical issue) against the particular important facet of 
the applicant’s existence to have the possibility to have children. In this 
case the ECtHR concluded that the afforded margin of appreciation must 
be a wide one. 
Where domestic authorities undertake a balancing exercise between 
competing private and public interests or different Convention rights and 
therein take into account the ECtHR’s case law, the accorded margin of 
appreciation continues to be wide post-2011.213 In addition, where the 
balancing exercise was undertaken in conformity with the criteria laid 
down in the case law, the ECtHR would need strong reasons to substitute 
                                                          
208 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 82-84.  
209 See among others Fernandez Martinez v. Spain [GC], Judgment of 12 June 2014, app. 
no. 56030/07, para. 123 et seq.; COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 4. 
210 Haas v. Switzerland, Judgment of 20 January 2011, app. no. 31322/07; Von Hannover 
v. Germany (No. 2) [GC], Judgment of 7 February 2012, apps. nos. 40660/08 and 
60641/08; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], Judgment of 15 March 2012, apps. nos. 4149/04 and 
41029/04; Kuric and Others v. Slovenia [GC], Judgment of 26 Junes 2012, app. no. 
26828/06; Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 13 November 2012, apps. nos. 
47039/11 and 358/12; Michaud v. France, Judgment of 06 December 2012, app. no. 
12323/11; Zorica Jovanovic v. Serbia, Judgment of 26 March 2013, app. no. 21794/08; 
Söderman v. Sweden [GC], Judgment of 12 November 2013, app. no. 5786/08; X v. Latvia 
[GC], Judgment of 26 November 2013, app. no. 27853/09; Nusret Kaya and Others v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 22 April 2014, apps. nos. 43750/06, 43752/06, 32054/08, 37753/08 
and 60915/08; Fernandez Martinez v. Spain (note 209); Mennesson v. France (note 198).  
211 See among others Mennesson v. France (note 198), para. 79-80.  
212 S.H. and Others v. Austria [GC], Judgment of 3 November 2011, app. no. 57813/00.  
213 See among others Aksu v. Turkey (note 210), para. 62-74; COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 
57) 2008, p. 4. 
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its view for that of the domestic courts.214 Furthermore, the choice of the 
means to secure compliance with the Convention obligations remains 
within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation.215  
The only judgment concerning one of the particular fields where national 
authorities traditionally enjoy a margin of appreciation concerns an issue 
regarding transsexualism. In Hämäläinen v. Finland216 the married male 
applicant underwent gender reassignment surgery. Thereafter she was 
only allowed to obtaining an identity card indicating her gender as female 
if she and her wife turned their marriage into a registered civil partnership. 
The ECtHR’s case law in this field has evolved in the past decade and has 
led to a narrowing of the margin of appreciation regarding issues of 
transsexualism and the finding of a right to legal recognition of gender 
reassignment surgery.217 However, the Contracting States still enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation as to the form this legal recognition takes and 
which consequences it entails.218 The ECtHR thus found no violation in 
the present judgment.  
6.2.2 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW CONCERNING 
ART. 8 ECHR 
In Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine219 the ECtHR has for the first time 
ordered the reinstatement in post of a person, in this case a Ukrainian 
Supreme Court judge, whose dismissal was found contrary to Art. 6 § 1 
and 8 ECHR. When taking into account that the ECtHR has been very 
reluctant to order individual remedies in the past and either ruled that the 
finding of a violation in itself constitutes just satisfaction or at most 
awarded a certain amount of compensation, this judgment constitutes a 
                                                          
214 See among others Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) (note 210), para. 107.  
215 See among others Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) (note 210), para. 104. 
216 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], Judgment of 16 July 2014, app. no. 37359/09. 
217 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 72-74; Hämäläinen v. Finland (note 216), para. 68-72. 
218 Hämäläinen v. Finland (note 216), para. 68-72.  
219 Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (note 158).  
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significant step towards acting in a less subsidiary manner vis-à-vis the 
Contracting States.220  
In Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands221 a 10 judges majority found no 
violation of Art. 8 ECHR for the domestic authorities’ refusal to grant the 
applicant testimonial privileges in criminal proceedings against her long-
term de facto partner and father of her two children. The majority found 
this interference with her right to family life to be proportionate even 
though her refusal to testify resulted in her being imprisoned for 12 days. 
The seven dissenting judges as well as some scholars222 rightly point out, 
that the present judgment is erroneous for two main reasons.  
Firstly, it constitutes a deviation from preceding case law concerning the 
use of the notion of “family life”. This notion has an autonomous meaning 
under the Convention and encompasses in addition to families based on 
marriage also other de facto relationships as the one the applicant and her 
long-term partner had.223 Deviating from its previous case law, the 
ECtHR decided that the applicant’s right to respect for her family life and 
thus access to testimonial privileges is subject to the formality of 
registering her relationship.224 By referring extensively to the principle of 
subsidiary,225 the ECtHR granted the domestic authorities a particularly 
wide margin of appreciation.  
Secondly, the ECtHR majority takes the view, that the current judgment 
involves two competing interests: the public interest in the protection of 
family life from State interference, and the public interest in the 
prosecution of serious crime.226 This is erroneous, as some of the 
dissenting judges rightly point out. In reality the balancing in the current 
judgment should be between the the applicant’s right to family life, which 
                                                          
220 See Concurring opinion of Judge Yudkivska to Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine (note 158). 
221 Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands [GC], Judgment of 3 April 2012, app. no. 42857/05.  
222 See for instance B. PASTRE-BELDA (note 125), p. 269; F. SUDRE (note 125), p. 244.  
223 Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands (note 221), para. 50.  
224 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Casadevall and Lopez Guerra to Van Der Hejden v. 
The Netherlands (note 221).  
225 Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands (note 221), para. 55-57. 
226 Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands (note 221), para. 62. 
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is competing with the public interest in the prosecution of serious crime. 
This approach amounts to downgrading the right guaranteed under Art. 8 
§ 1 ECHR to a public interest. In the words of the dissenting judges, this 
balancing exercise is thus “[…] quite simply contrary to the spirit and 
letter of Art. 8 ECHR […] and a worrying departure from the Court’s 
previous case-law”.227  
In the Van Der Hejden judgment the ECtHR accepts an important 
limitation on the rights guaranteed under Art. 8 ECHR. Through this self-
restraint, the ECtHR reduces the level of protection of this Convention 
guarantees.  
In general, many of the screened post-2011 judgments have been decided 
based on the width of the margin of appreciation accorded to the 
Contracting States. This has led to a number of decisions with strong 
minorities,228 which corresponds however to a tendency in line with the 
ECtHR’s pre-2011 case law. This tendency can among others be 
explained by the fact that the intensity of review under Art. 8 ECHR is 
generally slightly weaker than for instance under Art. 10 ECHR. The 
ECtHR therefore relies more strongly on the margin of appreciation when 
assessing proportionality under Art. 8 ECHR.229  
In the judgments S.H. v. Austria230 and Hristozov and Others v. 
Bulgaria231, where sensitive ethical and moral questions as well as 
societal choices were at stake, the ECtHR was willing to give a very wide 
margin of appreciation without decisively taking into account the 
existence of a European consensus. Despite the strong criticism expressed 
                                                          
227 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Vajic, Spielmann, Zupancic and Laffranque 
to Van Der Hejden v. The Netherlands (note 221).  
228 Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria (note 210) 4:3 decision; X v. Latvia (note 210) 8:9 
decision; Nusret Kaya and Others v. Turkey (note 210) 5:2 decision; Fernandez Martinez 
v. Spain (note 209) 8:9 decision.  
229 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 72-74, 87-92.  
230 S.H. and Others v. Austria (note 212).  
231 Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria (note 210). 
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concerning these judgments232 and the degree of deference towards the 
domestic authorities the ECtHR exerts therein, it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish a deviation from case law compared to the pre-2011 
jurisprudence in these judgments.  
6.2.3 ARTICLE 9 (FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND 
RELIGION) 
Article 9 ECHR guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion and protects both the right to hold a belief (internal aspect) 
as well as the right to express these beliefs by way of worship, teaching, 
practice, observance and others (external aspect). However, the protection 
under Art. 9 ECHR doesn’t go as far as to protect every act that is 
allegedly motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. The internal aspect 
of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is the core aspect of 
this right and not subject to the exceptions listed under Art. 9 § 2 
ECHR.233  
To determine if an interference with Art. 9 ECHR is justifiable, the 
ECtHR examines whether it is “prescribed by law”, has a “legitimate 
aim”234 and is “necessary in a democratic society”, as is the case for 
Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR. Given the importance of this guarantee, the 
review whether an interference complies with the guarantees enshrined in 
the outer aspect of Art. 9 ECHR, will be subject to a particularly 
scrupulous review and heightened standard of proportionality. However, 
the Contracting States enjoyed a certain margin of appreciation, going 
                                                          
232 J. P. MARGUENAUD, L’accès à des traitements expérimentaux gratuits refusé aux 
cancéreux en phase terminale, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 2013, p. 945 et 
seq; F. SUDRE (note 125), p. 44 et seq. Partly dissenting opinion of judge Kalaydjieva to 
Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria (note 210); Dissenting opinion of judge De Gaetano 
joined by judge Vucinic to Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria (note 210); Joint dissenting 
opinion of judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria to S.H. and 
Others v. Austria (note 212). 
233 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 93; S. C. PREBENSEN, The Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 
10 and 11 of the Convention, Human Rights Law Journal 1998, p. 13 et seq.  
234 The legitimate aims under Art. 9 § 2 ECHR are: the interests of public safety, the 
protection of public order, health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
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hand in hand with European supervision, in assessing the necessity and 
the extent of a restriction under this provision both before and after 
2011.235  
One of the fields where the ECtHR granted national authorities a certain 
discretion is the organisation of their system of national churches and the 
collection of church taxes. Another field where the Contracting States 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation concerns military service and more 
specifically the acceptance of conscientious objectors and the availability 
of an alternative kind of service.236  
In the screened post-2011 judgments237 the ECtHR mostly continues to 
apply a very stringent examination of interferences with Art. 9 ECHR. 
Given the general dearth of Art. 9 cases before and after 2011 that invoke 
the margin of appreciation doctrine it is however difficult to make general 
observations in this regard.238  
6.2.4 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW CONCERNING 
ART. 9 ECHR 
In Bayatyan v. Armenia239 the ECtHR found for the first time a violation 
of Art. 9 ECHR for convicting a conscious objector by invoking the 
existing European consensus in the matter as well as by applying the 
“living instrument” approach.240 The dissenting judge Gyulumyan241 
rightly pointed out that this decision breaches with the ECtHR’s long-
standing approach not to recognise the right to exemption from military 
service for conscientious objectors and to leave it to the Contracting 
                                                          
235 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 94-95.  
236 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 95-98.  
237 Francesco Sessa v. Italy, Judgment of 3 April 2012, app. no. 28790/08; Eweida and 
Others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 January 2013, apps. nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10; Magyar Kereszteny Mennonita Egyhaz and Others v. 
Hungary, Judgment of 8 April 2014, apps. nos. 70945/11, 23611/12, 41150/12, 41463/12, 
41553/12, 54977/12 and 56581/12.  
238 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 100.  
239 Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], Judgment of 7 July 2011, app. no. 23459/03. 
240 Bayatyan v. Armenia (note 239), para. 102-103.  
241 Dissenting opinion of Judge Gyulumyan to Bayatyan v. Armenia (note 239). 
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States’ discretion to offer some kind of an alternative service.242 Hence, 
the ECtHR extended the protection afforded under Art. 9 ECHR and 
diminished the discretion allowed to national authorities in the field of 
conscientious objection.243  
The applicant in S.A.S. v. France244, a woman who wears the burqa and 
niqab in accordance with her faith, complained that the French law 
prohibiting anyone to conceal their face in public places violates, among 
others, her right to respect for her private life under Art. 8 ECHR and her 
right to freedom to manifest her religion under Art. 9 ECHR.  
After finding an interference with the applicant’s rights under both Art. 8 
and 9 ECHR, the ECtHR proceeds to the usual examination of the 
conventionality of the interference by verifying whether this interference 
is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out 
in Art. 8 § 2 and 9 § 2 ECHR and is “necessary in a democratic society”.  
The interference, being itself a law, clearly fulfils the “prescribed by law” 
criteria. The examination of the legitimate aims is however particularly 
noteworthy in this judgment as the ECtHR departs from its usual practice 
“[…] to be quite succinct when it verifies the existence of a legitimate aim 
within the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the 
Convention”.245 The ECtHR, after a detailed examination of all the aims 
brought forward by the respondent State, comes to the conclusion that it 
is “[…] able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil 
concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the 
right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier”.246 Secondarily, the ECtHR finds that the interference 
also pursues the legitimate aim of addressing public safety concerns posed 
by face veiling.  
                                                          
242 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 98. 
243 See also W. JEAN-BAPTISTE, La reconnaissance du droit à l’objection de conscience par 
la cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 
2012, p. 671 et seq.  
244 S.A.S. v. France [GC], Judgment of 1 July 2014, app. no. 43835/11.  
245 S.A.S. v. France (note 244), para. 114.  
246 S.A.S. v. France (note 244), para. 122. 
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Regarding the public safety aim of the interference, the ECtHR finds that 
the law in question can’t be considered necessary in a democratic society 
given the absence of a general threat to public safety and the impact of the 
law on women such as the applicant who wish to wear the full-face veil 
for religious reasons.247 Concerning the aim to secure sociable conditions 
of “living together” the ECtHR first observes that the government 
attaches much weight to this aim and that it falls within the powers of the 
State to secure conditions whereby individuals can live together in their 
diversity.248 After expressing its concern regarding certain Islamophobic 
remarks that marked the debate preceding the adoption of the law in 
question, the ECtHR finds that the protection of the principle of 
interaction between individuals that is necessary in a democratic society 
constitutes a choice of society. As choices of society form part of general 
policy decisions, on which opinions may reasonably differ, the ECtHR 
holds that the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special 
weight. Finally, taking into account an alleged lack of a European 
consensus on the matter and having regard in particular to the wide margin 
of appreciation afforded to the respondent State the Court finds that the 
interference can be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued and thus 
“necessary in a democratic society”.249 By way of this detailed and 
carefully balanced reasoning the ECtHR finds a non-violation of both Art. 
8 and 9 ECHR.  
                                                          
247 S.A.S. v. France (note 244), para. 139. 
248 S.A.S. v. France (note 244), para. 141. 
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This judgment received much attention and has been strongly criticized 
by many observers250 as well as the two dissenting judges.251  
The first main criticism shared by most observers concerns the legitimate 
aim of “protecting the living together”. Even though the majority opinion 
points out that the “[…] enumeration of the exceptions […] listed in art. 
9 § 2 is exhaustive and their definition is restrictive”252 they accept the 
protection of the right of others to “living together” as a de facto new 
legitimate aim. Scared by its own audacity to introduce this innovative 
new legitimate aim,253 the majority opinion however admits, that the 
notion of “living together” is flexible and lends itself for potential abuse 
and thus requires a careful examination of the necessity of the interference 
in question. By exercising strong judicial self-restraint, the majority 
opinion nevertheless accepted the respondent State’s arguments in favour 
of this new aim.  
The second criticism concerns the “abyssal”254 margin of appreciation 
granted to the domestic authorities in this judgment. The breadth of the 
                                                          
250 See among others G. GONZALEZ/ G. HAARSCHER, Consécration jésuitique d’une exigence 
fondamentale de la civilité démocratique? Le voile intégral sous le regard des juges de la 
Cour européenne, Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 2015, p. 219 et seq.; C. 
RUET, L’interdiction du voile intégral dans l’espace public devant la Cour européenne : 
la voie étroite d’un équilibre, La Revue des droits de l’homme 2014, Actualités Droits-
Libertés, available at <http://revdh.revues.org/862>; V. CAMARERO SUAREZ, La 
Sentencia del TEDH en el caso S.A.S. c. Francia : un analisis critico, Revista General de 
Derecho Canonico y Derecho Eclesiastico del Estado 2015;  K. BLAY-GRABARCZYK, Une 
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dans-lespace-public>; R. MCCREA, The French ban on public face-veiling : enlarging the 
margin of appreciation, EU Law Analysis 2014, available at 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.ch/2014/07/the-french-ban-on-public-face-
veiling.html>; E. BREMS, S.A.S. v. France as a problematic precedent, Strasbourg 
Observers 2014, available at <http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-
france-as-a-problematic-precedent>; S. OUALD CHAIB / L. PERONI, S.A.S. v. France : 
Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing Face Veil ; Strasbourg 
Observers 2014, availablet at <http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-
france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil>.  
251 Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Nussberger and Jäderblom to S.A.S. v. France 
(note 244).  
252 S.A.S. v. France (note 244), para. 113. 
253 G. GONZALEZ/ G. HAARSCHER (note 250), p. 223-225.  
254 G. GONZALEZ/ G. HAARSCHER (note 250), p. 228. 
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margin of appreciation in the present judgment is, to say the least, 
noteworthy for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, many arguments drawn from the international and comparative 
law, the intervening NGOs as well as a large number of national and 
international human rights actors clearly point out that the impugned 
interference is disproportionate to the aim pursued and that the aim itself 
calls for a close scrutiny by the ECtHR. This close scrutiny is hardly 
compatible with a wide margin of appreciation.  
Secondly, the French law touches on an intimate right of members of a 
small minority within the respondent State’s society and can’t be 
considered to fall in the same category as general policies that regulate 
for instance the relationship between the State and religious institutions. 
As the ECtHR’s role is to protect individuals and minorities from 
disproportionate State interference imposed by a democratic majority the 
granting of a wide margin of appreciation is misplaced.  
Lastly, and probably most controversially, the majority opinion construes 
a fictive lack of European consensus to justify the broad margin of 
appreciation. The majority chose to ignore the fact that 45 out of 47 
Member States of the Council of Europe did not implement legislation to 
restrict the wearing of a full-face veil in public. Belgium being the only 
other State that opted for a ban while discussions in other States are on-
going, the ECtHR considers that the question of the wearing of the full-
face veil in public is “[…] simply not an issue at all in a certain number 
of Member States, where this practice is uncommon”.255 This led the 
Court to conclude that there is no consensus. In other words, instead of 
assessing whether there is a consensus to ban the wearing of a full-face 
veil in public, the majority opinion ignored the consensus among 45 
Contracting States to abstain from interfering in this field and construed 
a dissensus in Europa not to ban the full-face veil.256  
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In the S.A.S. v. France judgment, the majority opinion mobilises a very 
careful balancing act between societal choices and the individual freedom 
to express one’s religious beliefs. However, this careful approach can’t 
hide the fact that the ECtHR seems to resign, in the name of the principle 
of subsidiarity, from its supervisory role vis-à-vis the domestic 
authorities. This accommodating approach is furthermore very much in 
line with the demands last voiced at the Brighton conference.257 To 
conclude in the words of the dissenting judges, the majority opinion thus 
“[…] sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the Convention 
to abstract principles”.258  
6.2.5 ARTICLE 10 (FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION) 
Article 10 ECHR enshrines the fundamental freedom of expression that 
forms, according to the ECtHR’s constant jurisprudence, one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Given 
the proximity to the democratic political process of the freedom of 
expression, it is afforded a strong protection and the Strasbourg organs 
exert a stringent review of interferences with it. The exceptions listed 
under Art. 10 § 2 ECHR must be construed strictly and the need for any 
restrictions must be established convincingly.  
An interference is only justified if it is “prescribed by law”, pursues a 
“legitimate aim”259 and is “necessary in a democratic society”. In 
assessing whether an interference is necessary the domestic authorities 
have a certain margin of appreciation.260 
                                                          
257 G. GONZALEZ/ G. HAARSCHER (note 250), p. 225. 
258 Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Nussberger and Jäderblom to S.A.S. v. France 
(note 244), para. 2. 
259 Under Art. 10 ECHR the legitimate aims are: Interests of national security, territorial 
integrity and public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime, the protection of health 
or morals, the protection of the reputation or rights of others, the prevention of the 
disclosure of information received in confidence and the maintenance of the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.  
260 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 101-102; S. C. PREBENSEN (note 233), p. 14-16.  
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The scope of the margin of appreciation granted under Art. 10 ECHR 
depends on a number of factors such as “[…] the nature of the legitimate 
aim pursued, the scope, duration and effect of restricting measures as well 
as the nature of the expression, be it moral, commercial, artistic or 
political”.261 Among the particular grounds that affect the ambit of the 
margin of appreciation are “moral considerations”, “commercial speech 
and advertisement”, “the special role of the “press” as well as cases 
involving “elected representatives and political expression in general”. 
Regarding “moral considerations” the ECtHR recognises, that the 
requirements of morals vary from country to country or even within a 
country between regions. National authorities therefore enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in the assessment of morals. In cases concerning 
the restriction of “commercial speech and advertisement” as opposed to 
political expression, the national authorities also traditionally enjoy some 
discretion as they are seen to be better placed to assess the necessity of 
restrictions of strictly commercial expressions in their respective 
societies. When dealing with interferences with the freedom of “press” or 
the “political expression” particularly by “elected representatives” the 
ECtHR tends to apply a very close scrutiny and to reduce the discretion 
of the national authorities.262  
Generally, “[…] the Strasbourg organs are […] more prepared to apply a 
heightened standard of proportionality under Art. 10 ECHR than in 
relation to other Convention rights, curbing the latitudes of national 
discretion”.263 Therefore, even where particular policy grounds or factors 
widening the margin of appreciation are involved, the ECtHR exerted a 
very high standard of review in its pre-2011 case law.264  
 
                                                          
261 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 101. 
262 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 101-128; A. LEGG (note 76), p. 214.  
263 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 136.  
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In the majority of the screened post-2011 judgments265 the ECtHR 
confirmed its willingness to conduct a thorough proportionality 
assessment. Furthermore, the ECtHR reemphasized in several post-2011 
judgments the special role of the press and its vital function as a “public 
watchdog”.266 The Court also affirms that the acceptable criticisms 
regarding politicians are wider than regarding private individuals and that 
there is little scope for restricting freedom of expression in the area of 
political speech or debate, particularly for elected representatives of the 
people.267  
6.2.6 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW CONCERNING 
ART. 10 ECHR 
In the Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom268 
judgment, the applicant NGO complains that its campaign TV spot 
advocating against the use of animals in commerce, science and leisure 
was prohibited on the basis of the British law banning political advertising 
in both radio and television. Deviating from its previous case law 
established in VgT v. Switzerland269 and TV Vest v. Norway270 and by 
enlarging the margin of appreciation granted to domestic authorities, a 9:8 
majority found no violation of Art. 10 ECHR. The judgment was 
particularly criticised firstly for the widening of the margin of 
appreciation in the ambit of a guarantee as fundamental as Art. 10 ECHR 
                                                          
265 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, Judgment of 15 March 2011, app. no. 2034/07; RTBF v. 
Belgium, Judgment of 29 March 2011, app. no. 50084/06; Editorial Board of Pravoye 
Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, Judgment of 5 May 2011, app. no. 33014/05; Heinisch v. 
Germany, Judgment of 21 July 2011, app. no. 28274/08; Axel Springer AG v. Germany 
[GC], Judgment of 7 February 2012, app. no. 39954/08; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy [GC], Judgment of 7 June 2012, app. no. 38433/09; Ahmet Yildirim v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 18 December 2012, app. no. 3111/10.  
266 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine (note 265), para. 64; Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany (note 265), para. 79; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v. 
Italy (note 265), para. 131.  
267 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain (note 265), para. 50.  
268 Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom [GC], Judgment of 22 April 
2013, app. no. 48876/08.  
269 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, Judgment of 28 June 2001, app. no. 
24699/94, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, ECHR 2001-VI.   
270 TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, Judgment of 11 December 20008, 
app. no. 21132/05.  
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and secondly for the unjustified deviation from established case law in 
favour of the domestic authorities.271  
While the ECtHR found in its VgT v. Switzerland judgment that the 
general prohibition on political advertising is not necessary in a 
democratic society and thus violates Art. 10 ECHR, it came to the 
opposite conclusion in the present judgment. This is all the more notable 
as the Animal Defenders International judgment concerns “public interest 
speech” that is particularly protected under the ECHR raised by an NGO 
that exercises a public watchdog role of similar importance to that of the 
press.272  
The close review these elements call for is only difficult to reconcile with 
the widened margin of appreciation that was granted in the present 
judgment.  
Despite the initial finding that “[…] the margin of appreciation to be 
accorded to the State in the present context is, in principle, a narrow 
one”273 the ECtHR moved on to attach considerable weight to the 
exacting and pertinent reviews exerted by both parliamentary and judicial 
bodies in the UK in the present case. Finding then that the lack of 
European consensus in the matter could allow a somewhat wider margin 
of appreciation to the domestic authorities the ECtHR concludes without 
further justification that in the present case the lack of consensus actually 
does widen the margin of appreciation.274  
The approach taken by the ECtHR risks to introduce a distinction between 
interferences that originate directly from legislation and those that don’t. 
                                                          
271 P. DUCOULOMBIER, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom: institutional 
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61 
Furthermore, the existence of less restrictive measures to achieve the 
same goal were not considered as it used to be the case in previous Art. 
10 ECHR judgments.275 The current judgment therefore leaves the 
impression that the ECtHR uses the margin of appreciation in order not to 
interfere with the choice of the national legislator.  
In the Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland276 judgment the 
applicant, a non-profit association, complains that its poster campaign has 
not been authorised by the authority of the City of Neuchâtel, a decision 
later upheld by the regional and national courts. The poster in question 
displays pictures of extra-terrestrials’ faces, a pyramid together with a 
flying saucer and the earth. In addition, it featured the sentences “the 
message from extra-terrestrials” and “science at last replaces religion” as 
well as the address of the association’s website and a French phone 
number. In any case, the content of the posters as such was not the reason 
relied on to withhold the authorisation for the campaign. Instead, the 
domestic authorities justified their refusal with the fact that the Raelian 
Movement engaged in and promoted activities such as paedophilia, incest 
or human cloning that were immoral and contrary to public order. In 
addition, the national authorities argued that the website promoted on the 
poster contained a link to the website of Clonaid, which offers specific 
services in the area of cloning contrary to Swiss law. A number of judicial 
proceedings involving members of the application association have also 
contributed to the refusal in question.277  
The ECtHR Grand Chamber followed the Chamber in finding no 
violation of Art. 10 ECHR with a very narrow 9:8 majority. The ECtHR 
attached particular importance to the wide margin of appreciation of the 
domestic authorities and their detailed reasoning in line with the ECtHR 
case law concerning Art. 10 ECHR.  
                                                          
275 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 129-130.  
276 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland [GC], Judgment of 13 July 2012, app. no. 
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As the existence of an interference with Art. 10 ECHR and its prescription 
by law serving a legitimate aim were undisputed, the main question to be 
determined was the necessity of the interference in a democratic society. 
Before determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation the ECtHR 
reiterates that “[…] the present case is singular in the sense that it raises 
the question whether the national authorities were required to permit the 
applicant association to disseminate its ideas through a poster campaign 
by making certain public space available to it for that purpose”.278  
The ECtHR thereafter argues that the poster campaign is not of political 
nature as it draws the viewer’s attention to the association’s activities and 
has a certain proselytising function. Even though the Court admits that the 
association’s speech also falls outside the commercial advertising context 
it concludes without adducing any further reason that it is nevertheless 
closer to commercial speech than to political speech. Being closer to 
commercial speech, a field where the ECtHR traditionally allowed more 
discretion to the national authorities, the margin of appreciation is thus 
widened.  
The margin of appreciation in the present judgment is furthermore 
widened as the association’s activities concern matters that are liable to 
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, 
especially, religion. By invoking the principle of subsidiarity and 
reiterating that the local authorities are closer to the realities of their 
countries the ECtHR finds that it is within their discretion to examine 
whether a poster satisfies certain statutory requirements.279  
Taken all-together the ECtHR concludes that the domestic authorities 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation and that only serious reasons could 
lead it to substitute its own assessment for that of the national authorities. 
The following review of the national reasoning is then restricted to a 
summary control of the scrutiny and not the reasoning exerted by the 
national courts. The ECtHR further emphasized that the limited scope of 
                                                          
278 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (note 276), para. 57.  
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the interference influenced its decision to find the interference to be 
proportional to the aim pursued.  
Finally, the ECtHR emphasized that the five national authorities which 
examined the case gave detailed reasons for their decisions and referred 
to the ECtHR’s case law in the area of freedom of speech. The Court 
finally concluded on the basis of the foregoing arguments that there were 
“[…] no serious reasons to substitute its own assessment for that of the 
Federal Court”.280 Accordingly, it concluded that there has been no 
violation of Art. 10 ECHR.  
This judgment has been strongly criticised by different observers281 as 
well as by the 8 dissenting judges in three comprehensive separate 
opinions282 attached to the judgment.  
The criticism mainly focuses on two aspects of the judgment that are 
closely linked: firstly the classification of the type of speech in question 
as “[…] closer to commercial speech than to political speech per se”283 
and secondly the breadth of the margin of appreciation accorded to the 
domestic authorities.  
Introducing by way of a “patchwork of reasons”284 a hybrid type of 
speech, which is neither commercial nor political but allowing a greater 
margin of appreciation constitutes “[…] a new standard running counter 
to the Court’s well-established case law and diminishes the protection of 
                                                          
280 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (note 276), para. 67-77. 
281 J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 43 et seq.; P. MUZNY, La liberté d’expression des idéeaux par voie 
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282 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Sajo, Lazarova Trajkovska, Bianku, Power-
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Joint dissenting opinion of judges Sajo, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vucinic to Mouvement 
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283 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (note 276), para. 62.  
284 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Sajo, Lazarova Trajkovska, Bianku, Power-
Forde, Vucinic and Yudkivska (note 282), para. 2.  
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speech, without offering compelling reasons”.285 It is thus hardly a 
convincing way to justify a wide margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the 
fact that neither the association itself nor its website are banned as such 
in Switzerland doesn’t support the finding that the impugned interference 
is necessary in a democratic society. In fact, refusing the prior 
authorisation to use a publicly accessible forum such as billboards 
displaying posters because the ideas displayed are not favourably received 
by the domestic authorities amounts to state censorship contrary to Art. 
10 ECHR and the governmental obligation of neutrality.286  
Under the pretext of a wide margin of appreciation the ECtHR fails to 
conduct an appropriate analysis of the reasons put forward by the national 
authorities, accepting a number of reasons that “[…] taken separately, 
might not be capable of justifying the impugned refusal”287 to legitimise 
the interference.288 The margin of appreciation was thus misused as a 
“vehicle of unprincipled deferentialism”289 to the domestic authorities.  
This deferential approach and the outer, procedural control of the 
necessity of the interference further allowed the ECtHR to satisfy itself 
that the national authorities acted in good faith, an approach rejected in 
its previous case law.290  
Some observers argue that the impact of the present judgment on the 
future Art. 10 ECHR case law will be limited due to the singularity of the 
circumstances.291 That being said, the reasoning employed in the present 
judgment is far from being an isolated incident and should not be 
underestimated. This judgment is a clear example of the ECtHR’s new 
approach to act in a strictly subsidiary manner vis-à-vis the national 
authorities and to give unprecedented prominence to the principle of 
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subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine. Following this new 
approach, the Court doesn’t stop from deviating from its own case law 
and to rely on patchy argumentation. As confirmed by some of the 
observers, this approach is very much in line and assumedly influenced 
by the demands voiced in the three declarations of Interlaken, Izmir and 
Brighton.292 
6.2.7 ARTICLE 11 (FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION) 
Article 11 ECHR enshrines the two interlinked but distinct rights of 
freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. The word 
“association” is thereby to be understood as having an autonomous 
meaning within the ECHR. The right of peaceful assembly, as a lex 
specialis to the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Art. 10 ECHR 
constitutes a fundamental right in a democratic society and one of its 
foundations. As is the case for Arts. 8-11 ECHR, any interference with 
the guarantees under Art. 11 ECHR can only be justified if it is 
“prescribed by law”, has a “legitimate aim”293 and is “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The exceptions set out under Art. 11 § 2 ECHR are 
to be construed strictly and the Contracting States have only a limited 
margin of appreciation in determining whether an interference is 
necessary in a democratic society. In addition to the common legitimate 
aims under the second paragraphs of Arts. 8-10 ECHR, Art. 11 § 2 ECHR 
expressly mentions the lawfulness of restrictions of this guarantee on 
members of the armed forces, the police or the administration of the 
State.294  
The fields where the ECtHR traditionally widened the scope of the margin 
of appreciation granted to nation authorities include cases concerning 
issues of “national security” or “public safety and prevention of disorder” 
as well as cases involving the regulation of specific rights of “trade 
                                                          
292 See J.P. RUI (note 6), p. 43; G. GUILLEMIN (note 281). 
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unions”. It is however difficult to establish clear trends, given the dearth 
of pre-2011 cases concerning Art. 11 ECHR complaints.295  
In the screened post-2011 judgments296 the ECtHR confirmed its previous 
jurisprudence. It continued to narrow the margin of appreciation where 
core aspects of Art. 11 ECHR were concerned297 and the absence of a 
European consensus widened the leeway given to Contracting States also 
post-2011.298 In addition, the jurisprudence in fields such as “trade 
unions”299 where domestic authorities traditionally enjoyed a margin of 
appreciation remains unchanged.  
6.2.8 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS ON THE PERSONAL FREEDOMS 
The margin of appreciation doctrine continues to play a particularly 
important role in the realm of the personal freedoms enshrined in Articles 
8-11 ECHR. Each of the rights enshrined in those Articles lists the 
conditions under which interferences are justified. This is a strong 
indicator for the fact that these rights, by their nature, cannot be 
guaranteed unreservedly. A personal freedom of one individual can only 
be guaranteed as far as it doesn’t interfere with the rights of another 
individual and thus often requires the domestic authorities to undertake a 
balancing exercise between competing rights. In addition, the national 
authorities regularly need to weigh the individual freedom against the 
interest of their society in general. The personal freedom guarantees 
enshrined in the ECHR thus provide fertile ground for disagreement and 
competing interpretations of the Convention provisions. They also 
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involve policy grounds where opinions in democratic societies can 
reasonably differ.  
These are factors that are strongly reflected in the ECtHR’s case law. Only 
a few of the judgments have been decided unanimously, but often they 
feature a strong dissenting minority of judges.  
Two of the ECtHR’s post-2011 judgments, Oleksandr Volkov v. 
Ukraine300 (Art. 8 ECHR) and Bayatyan v. Armenia301 (Art. 9 ECHR), 
introduce noteworthy evolutions of the Court’s case law. The recognition 
of the right to “conscious objection” in the Bayatyan case somewhat 
diminishes the Contracting States’ discretion under the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion enshrined in Art. 9 ECHR. In the 
Oleksandr Volkov judgment, the ECtHR didn’t hesitate to go beyond its 
fundamentally subsidiary role to reinstate a Ukrainian Supreme Court 
judge who has been unlawfully dismissed.  
Besides these, from the perspective of the protection of human rights, 
positive developments, it is clearly identifiable that the stronger trend in 
the ECtHR’s post-2011 case law goes towards a more subsidiary role of 
the Court and more discretion for the national authorities to the detriment 
of the protection of individual rights. As part of this current approach, the 
ECtHR has repeatedly used the margin of appreciation doctrine to justify 
its large degree of deference to the national authorities. The Van der 
Hejden v. The Netherlands302 (Art. 8 ECHR), S.A.S. v. France303 (Art. 9 
ECHR), Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom304 as 
well as the Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland305 (Art. 10 ECHR) 
judgments are exemplary for this trend. In addition, one cannot but notice 
that this trend is very much in line with the demands voiced at the three 
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conferences in Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton, as other observers also 
point out.306  
6.3 ART. 14: NON-DISCRIMINATION  
6.3.1 PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
Art. 14 ECHR enshrines the prohibition of discrimination and provides a 
non-exhaustive list of banned grounds for discrimination such as sex, 
race, colour or religion. Violations of the prohibition of discrimination 
under Art. 14 ECHR can only be invoked if the violation in question falls 
within the protected sphere of one of the substantive rights of the ECHR. 
The prohibition of discrimination is thus complementary and has no 
independent standing.307  
States are inescapably confronted with situations where they need to 
differentiate between different (groups of) individuals. Thus, not every 
difference of treatment is contrary to the prohibition of discrimination 
under Art. 14 ECHR. In order to be justified, differences in treatment must 
pursue a “legitimate aim” by means that are proportional to the aim 
pursued.308 To assess if a measure amounts to a “difference in treatment” 
contrary to Art. 14 ECHR the ECtHR applies the “analogous situation 
test”. This test is used to determine if persons who are in analogous 
situations are treated differently or if persons who are in sufficiently 
different situations are treated equally. In order to fulfil the conditions of 
this test, individuals must show that they are treated differently and less 
favourably compared to individuals in analogous situations and that the 
difference in treatment therefore amounts to a “discrimination” under Art. 
14 ECHR.309  
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308 J. SCHOKKENBROEK, The Prohibition of Discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention 
and the Margin of Appreciation, Human Rights Law Journal 1998, p. 20.  
309 Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 167-168; ST. GREER (note 57), 2000, p. 11.  
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Pre-2011 the Contracting States have enjoyed a certain margin of 
appreciation, depending on the circumstances, the subject matter and its 
background, when assessing whether differences in treatment are 
justifiable. An important factor, which influences the width of the margin, 
is the existence or non-existence of a consensus among the Contracting 
States. The existence of a European consensus thereby tends to narrow 
the margin of appreciation.310  
Furthermore, the ECtHR applies a very strict standard of proportionality 
and decisively narrows or excludes any margin of appreciation if a 
difference of treatment is based on one of the “suspect categories”. These 
suspect categories were developed over time in the ECtHR’s case law and 
include “sex”, “race”, “nationality”, “religion” and “illegitimacy” in a 
very evolving approach, taking into account changing social realities. In 
such cases the ECtHR did not hesitate to impose the burden of proof for 
the necessity of the difference in treatment to domestic authorities.311  
In the screened post-2011 judgments312 the ECtHR continued to apply its 
strict standard of review and special consideration of the traditional 
“suspect categories”.  
6.3.2 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW REGARDING ART. 
14 ECHR 
In its post-2011 case law the ECtHR reconfirmed and somewhat enlarged 
its protection against discrimination on grounds of “sexual orientation” 
under Art. 14 ECHR. In both the 2013 Vallianatos and Others v. 
                                                          
310 J. SCHOKKENBROEK (note 308), p. 20-21; Y. ARAI (note 57), p. 168; COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
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Greece313 and the X and Others v. Austria314 judgments, the ECtHR 
explicitly applied the same heightened degree of scrutiny as in cases 
concerning discrimination on the grounds of “sex”, one of the traditional 
“suspect categories”. Thereby it reduced the national authorities’ margin 
of appreciation. Furthermore, the ECtHR imposed the burden of proof on 
the respondent Government to show the necessity of the differential 
treatment and required particularly convincing and weighty reasons to 
justify the difference in treatment of the applicants based on their sexual 
orientation.315  
In the X and Others v. Austria judgment the ECtHR found a violation of 
Art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR for not allowing second-
parent adoption for an unmarried homosexual couple, while unmarried 
heterosexual couples had this possibility. This judgment is noteworthy in 
so far as it only grants a narrow margin of appreciation for a difference in 
treatment in a field such as adoption law where States usually enjoy a 
wide margin. Through a combination of a strict review of proportionality, 
the finding of a questionable lack of consensus in the matter as well as a 
strong use of the “living instrument” approach a 10:7 majority finally 
found a violation.316 Given the close decision and the strong criticism 
voiced by the 7 dissenting judges it remains however open how this 
judgment will influence the future jurisprudence in this field.  
In the Vallianatos and Others v. Greece judgment the ECtHR found a 
violation of Art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR for the 
creation of a civil partnership, which is not open to homosexuals. By 
doing so it recognised that if a form of “public engagement” other than 
marriage exists in a Contracting State, the access of homosexual couples 
to it nowadays constitutes a minimum condition of family life as 
                                                          
313 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], Judgment of 7 November 2013, apps. nos. 
29381/09 and 32684/09.  
314 X and Others v. Austria [GC], Judgment of 19 February 2013, app. no. 19010/07.  
315 X and Others v. Austria (note 314), para. 99, 141; Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 
(note 313), para. 77, 85.  
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enshrined in Art. 8 ECHR.317 Despite the fact that the ECHR does not 
guarantee a right to a civil partnership the ECtHR found a violation of the 
prohibition of discrimination for guaranteeing this right in a 
discriminatory manner. The ECtHR also discarded the Greek legislator’s 
argument that the aim of the law in question was to regulate the status of 
children born outside marriage by providing an alternative legally 
recognised union in addition to marriage. This judgment is a strong 
example of the ECtHR’s new willingness to conduct an effective and in-
depth control of proportionality as well as to decisively narrow the margin 
of appreciation granted to national authorities in cases concerning 
differences in treatment based on sexual orientation.  
The ECtHR confirmed its previous approach to exert a stringent review 
in Art. 14 ECHR cases and even extended the protection against 
discrimination where the difference in treatment is based on sexual 
orientation.  
6.4 ARTS. 2-4 AND 7: NON-DEROGATORY RIGHTS 
6.4.1 ARTICLE 2 (RIGHT TO LIFE) 
Article 2 ECHR enshrines the fundamental right to life. The right to life 
not only prohibits the intentional and unlawful taking of life by States 
through their agents but additionally puts a positive obligation on States 
to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction.318 In regard to the procedural aspect of the right, Article 2 
ECHR requires States to conduct a prompt and effective official 
investigation into alleged breaches of this provision.319 However, positive 
                                                          
317 A. DANIS-FATOME, Le droit des couples à un „engagement public“, Revue Trimestrielle 
des Droits de l’Homme 2014, p. 749.  
318 Saso Gorgiev v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Judgment of 19 July 
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Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], Judgment of 17 July 2014, app. no. 47848/08, para. 130.  
319 Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom (note 112), para. 163; Finogenov and others 
v. Russia (note 142), para. 267; Mehmet Sentürk and Bekir Sentürk v. Turkey, Judgment 
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obligations are not to impose an excessive burden on the States and the 
choice of means to ensure these obligations fall within the States’ margin 
of appreciation before and after 2011.320  
In its second paragraph, Article 2 ECHR describes the situations where 
the use of force, which may result as an unintended outcome in the 
deprivation of life, is permitted. The use of force must be “no more than 
absolutely necessary” which indicates that a stricter and more compelling 
test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable for the 
“necessity test” under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 - 11 ECHR.321  
Therefore, the Court did not allow any margin of appreciation regarding 
this provision before 2011.322 In all the screened post-2011 ECHR 
judgments323 concerning Art. 2 ECHR the Court continued to subject 
alleged breaches to the most careful scrutiny. Art. 2 ECHR also continues 
to enjoy its particular importance post-2011 as one of the most 
fundamental provisions from which no derogation under Art. 15 ECHR 
is permitted.  
An aspect that, due to a lack of European consensus, continues to fall 
within the State’s margin of appreciation in the ECtHR’s post-2011 case 
law is the issue of when the right to life begins.324 The lack of European 
consensus had also been invoked when the ECtHR refused to 
acknowledge a right to die under Art. 2 ECHR in the 2002 Pretty v. UK325 
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judgment.326 In Figenov and others v. Russia327, the ECtHR was 
furthermore prepared to grant the domestic authorities a margin of 
appreciation for the military and technical aspects of a hostage rescue 
operation. However, the ECtHR applied different degrees of scrutiny to 
different aspects of the operation as it did in its pre-2011 case law and 
found a violation of Art. 2 ECHR.328  
6.4.2 ARTICLE 3 (PROHIBITION OF TORTURE) 
Article 3 ECHR prohibits in absolute terms torture as well as inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment. According to the ECtHR’s case law 
there is no room for balancing the rights protected by Art. 3 ECHR against 
other rights or any public interest as inherent to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. In addition, no derogation from Art. 3 ECHR under Art. 15 
ECHR is permitted.329  
Underlining its absolute prohibition, the ECtHR held in the 1978 Tyrer v. 
The United Kingdom330 judgment that “no local requirement relative to 
the maintenance of law and order would entitle any of [the Contracting 
States] to make use of a punishment contrary to Article 3”.331 
Furthermore, the legal classification of an act or omission as falling within 
the scope of Article 3 ECHR lies within the exclusive power of the 
ECtHR.332  
Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within 
the scope of Art. 3 ECHR and the assessment of this minimum is relative 
depending on the circumstances of the case in question. The scope of 
inhuman or degrading treatment is therefore subject to the circumstances 
                                                          
326 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (note 57) 2008, p. 8.  
327 Finogenov and others v. Russia (note 142). 
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of the case, as it was pointed out in the Soering v. UK333 landmark 
judgment.334  
Similar to Art. 2 ECHR, the prohibition of torture includes a procedural 
limb. Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered 
treatment infringing Art. 3 ECHR at the hands of agents of the State, this 
provision requires by implication that there should be an effective official 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible.335  
Furthermore, the prohibition of torture entails the positive obligation for 
States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their 
jurisdiction are not subjected to treatment contrary to Art. 3 ECHR.336 
However, this positive obligation is to be interpreted in such a way as not 
to impose an excessive burden on the authorities.337  
In the screened post-2011 judgments338 concerning Art. 3 ECHR the 
ECtHR continued to underline its fundamental and non-derogatory 
nature. The ECtHR also repeatedly found that even in difficult 
circumstances arising from terrorism or strong migratory influx, States 
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cannot be absolved of their obligations under Art. 3 ECHR, having regard 
to the absolute character of this provision.339  
6.4.3 CHANGES IN THE ECTHR POST-2011 CASE LAW REGARDING ART. 
3 ECHR 
The ECtHR’s post-2011 Article 3 ECHR jurisprudence has undergone 
some notable changes concerning the principle of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. In the 2013 Vinter and Others v. UK340 
judgment, the ECtHR for the first time held that, where domestic law does 
not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a life sentence, 
this is firstly incompatible with Article 3 ECHR and secondly the 
incompatibility on this ground already arises at the moment of the 
imposition of the whole life sentence.341 This finding has been confirmed 
in the subsequent Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria342 judgment. This 
development in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence represents a narrowing of the 
State’s longstanding margin of appreciation in designing their criminal 
justice system.343 The ECtHR justified this new finding with the clear 
support in European and International law for the principle that all 
prisoners be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of 
release and the new emphasis in European penal policy on the 
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, even for those serving life 
sentences.344 The form of the review of the life sentence however stays 
within the margin of appreciation of the States. In the light of the new 
European consensus on the aim of penal policy the ECtHR enforced its 
view that the lack of a mechanism or a possibility for review of life 
sentences amounts to a violation of Art. 3 ECHR from the moment of the 
imposition of the sentence. Notwithstanding its subsidiary role vis-à-vis 
the domestic authorities, the ECtHR accordingly substituted its own view 
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for that of the national authorities and narrowed their margin of 
appreciation.  
The dissenting judge Villiger criticises this development in Vinter and 
Others v. UK345 among others because the “[…] general and abstract 
application of Article 3 to the present case [doesn’t easily square] with the 
principle of subsidiarity underlying the Convention, not least when […] 
issues relating to just and proportionate punishment are the subject of 
rational debate and civilised disagreement”346 and thus lie within the 
discretion of the Contracting States.   
A second development in the ECtHR’s post-2011 jurisprudence in 
relation to the principle of subsidiarity is to be found in M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece347. This case concerns an Afghan national who fled his 
country out of fear of reprisals from the anti-government forces as he 
worked as an interpreter for the international air force personnel stationed 
there. The applicant entered the EU via Greece and then moved on to 
Belgium where he applied for asylum. As Greece under the Dublin 
Regulation is responsible for any asylum seeker entering the EU through 
their territory, the Belgian authorities ordered the applicant to leave the 
country to Greece. On his arrival there he was immediately placed in 
detention for four days. After his release he was equipped with an asylum-
seekers’ card and thereafter lived in the street, having no means of 
subsistence.  
This case marks an important development regarding the Court’s 
subsidiarity vis-à-vis both the Belgian and the Greek authorities.  
The first novelty introduced by this judgment is the finding of a violation 
of Art. 3 ECHR by the Belgian authorities for returning the applicant to 
Greece according to the Dublin II regulation. The M.S.S. judgment has a 
potentially important impact on the Common European Asylum System, 
as it reintroduces a strong control of conventionality in European asylum 
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matters by the ECtHR and reinforces the human rights protection in this 
field.348  
A second important development introduced by the judgment is the 
finding of a violation of Art. 3 ECHR by Greece for the living conditions 
of the applicant amounting to inhumane treatment; a situation shared by 
thousands of other asylum seekers. Furthermore, the ECtHR for the first 
time recognised asylum seekers as a vulnerable group. Both elements will 
potentially influence the future ECtHR jurisprudence in asylum matters 
and enlarge the protection under Art. 3 ECHR.349  
The third change is the one most related to the principle of subsidiarity. 
In the M.S.S. judgment the ECtHR found the applicant’s potential 
refoulement to be in violation of Art. 13 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 
3 ECHR. The ECtHR thus found that Greece offered no effective remedy 
as required by Art. 13 ECHR against the applicant’s potential 
refoulement, but did not assess whether the potential refoulement would 
violate Art. 3 ECHR taken alone. The ECtHR thereby departs from its 
usual approach and for the first time subordinates itself to the national 
authorities concerning the assessment of the applicant’s “arguable 
claim”350 of the risk that his refoulement would be in breach of Art. 3 
ECHR taken alone.  
The usual approach of the ECtHR in similar cases has been to examine in 
a first step whether the applicant’s refoulement back to Afghanistan 
would subject him to treatment contrary to Art. 3 ECHR alone. This 
followed the rationale that, if the ECtHR found that the refoulement would 
violate Art. 3 ECHR taken alone, this finding would prevent the 
Contracting State from actually expelling the applicant. In its usual 
approach, the ECtHR would then only in a separate second step examine 
the risk of refoulement under Art. 3 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 13 
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ECHR to assess as well the effectiveness of the available remedies against 
violations of Art. 3 ECHR.  
The usual approach could therefore firstly lead to finding a violation of 
Art. 3 ECHR alone and secondly finding an additional violation of Art. 
13 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 3 ECHR for the lack of effectiveness 
of the available remedies.351 If the ECtHR had found that a refoulement 
of the applicant in M.S.S. would amount to a violation of Art. 3 ECHR 
taken alone, the Greek authorities would have been prevented from 
returning him to Afghanistan. The sole finding of a violation of Art. 13 
ECHR in conjunction with Art. 3 ECHR on the other hand wouldn’t be 
able to prevent his expulsion. Or as the dissenting Judge Villiger puts it: 
“[Expecting to prevent the applicant’s deportation] would be 
overstretching the potential of a complaint under Article 13”.352  
In M.S.S. v. Greece, the ECtHR holds in deviation of its usual approach 
that “it is in the first place for the Greek authorities […] themselves to 
[…] assess the risks to which [the applicant] would be exposed in 
Afghanistan”.353 Thus, the ECtHR is not conducting its own assessment 
under Art. 3 ECHR in this new approach and is acting strictly subsidiary 
to the Greek authorities. This way of proceeding is new in the context of 
Art. 3 ECHR. It was therefore classified as “innovatory”354 by the 
dissenting Judge Villiger and leads to the situation, that the Greek 
government is free to conduct its own assessment of whether the 
deportation of the applicant back to Afghanistan would amount to a 
violation of Art. 3 ECHR. This is particularly noteworthy as the ECtHR 
found that the applicant did not have any effective remedies available to 
him in Greece that would prevent his expulsion. The domestic authorities 
can potentially find that he can be deported to Afghanistan despite the 
widely documented malfunctioning of the Greek asylum system and the 
situation in Afghanistan, which are repeatedly noted in this judgment.355 
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If the Greek authorities in their own assessment find the applicant’s return 
to Afghanistan not to be in breach of Art. 3 ECHR, he would then have to 
go through the whole Greek judicial system again and will potentially 
have to bring his complaint again before the ECtHR.  
This judgment has also implications for future cases regarding 
refoulement issues, leaving the domestic authorities the leeway to proceed 
to a deportation despite the finding of a violation of Art. 13 in conjunction 
with Art. 3 ECHR. By acting in such a subsidiary manner vis-à-vis the 
national authorities,356 the ECtHR has set a dangerous precedent in the 
realm of one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention. Judge 
Villinger accordingly chose a strong wording in his separate opinion: “I 
am all in favour of the principle of subsidiarity, but I think here is the 
wrong place to apply it. […] Subsidiarity does not permit [an Article 3 
ECHR complaint] to be “downgraded” so that it is no longer 
independently examined”.357  
6.4.4 ARTICLE 4 (PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOUR) 
Article 4 ECHR prohibits in absolute terms slavery, servitude and forced 
or compulsory labour and thus enshrines one of the fundamental values 
of democratic societies without provisions for exceptions or derogation 
under Article 15 ECHR.358 
According to the ECtHR’s case law, the term “forced or compulsory 
labour” means in accordance with the corresponding Convention of the 
International Labour Organisation “all work or service which is exacted 
from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily”.359  
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The only post-2011 case regarding Art. 4 ECHR concerns an Austrian 
prisoner who complains that the prison work performed by him amounted 
to “forced or compulsory labour” because he wasn’t free to do it and 
because it was without affiliation to the old-age pension system. He 
argued that European standards had changed to such an extent that prison 
work without affiliation to the old-age pension system could no longer be 
regarded as work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention 
falling under Art. 4 § 3 ECHR. The Court’s case law concerning prison 
work is scarce and the only decision in this connection goes back to 
1968.360 Despite the significant developments in the field of penal policy 
including the recognition of the principle of normalisation of prison work 
and a majority of Contracting States who affiliate working prisoners to 
the old-age pension system, the ECtHR did not find a violation of Art. 4 
ECHR. The Court based its decision on the insufficient consensus among 
Contracting States.361  
The ECHR is considered a living instrument to be read in the light of the 
notions currently prevailing in democratic States, as the ECtHR has 
repeatedly held and also reiterates in the judgment at hand.362 Particularly 
in connection with Article 4 ECHR, as a fundamental right and one of the 
four non-derogatory provisions of the ECHR, the “lacking European 
consensus” reasoning of the ECtHR is striking. The main function of the 
“European consensus” reasoning is to determine the extent of the margin 
of appreciation, which so far hasn’t been applied regarding the most 
fundamental provisions of the ECHR. Furthermore, the question of 
whether the applicant was subject to “forced or compulsory labour” is one 
of legal qualification within the exclusive power of the ECtHR and as 
such does not lend itself to grant States a margin of appreciation.363 In this 
judgment the ECtHR failed to ensure that Article 4 ECHR offers a 
practical and effective guarantee and didn’t adapt the interpretation of 
                                                          
360 Twenty-One Detained Persons v. Germany, Commission decision of 6 April 1968, apps. 
nos. 3134/67, 3172/67 and 3188-3206/67.  
361 Stummer v. Austria (note 358), para. 130-134.  
362 Stummer v. Austria (note 358), para. 118. 
363 J. CALLEWAERT (note 82), p. 9. 
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Article 4 ECHR to present-day conditions. Or as the dissenting Judge 
Tulkens puts it: “The flexibility inherent in the margin of appreciation is 
admittedly an essential factor, but […] it must go hand in hand with 
European supervision. Such supervision was lacking in the present 
case”.364  
6.4.5 ARTICLE 7 (NO PUNISHMENT WITHOUT LAW) 
Article 7 ECHR enshrines an essential element of the rule of law, occupies 
a prominent place in the ECHR and allows no derogation under Art. 15 
ECHR. It prohibits arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment as 
well as the retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused’s 
disadvantage. Furthermore, it enshrines the fundamental principle that 
only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, 
nulla poena sine lege).365 States are generally free to determine their own 
penal policy as long as they comply with the requirements of Article 7 
ECHR. In its post-2011 case law, the ECtHR continues to grant States 
discretion in the choice of means as long as they comply with the strictly 
prescribed aim to guarantee that no punishment shall be imposed without 
an underlying law. 366 The concept of a “penalty” in this provision is 
furthermore an autonomous concept of the ECHR and the ECtHR readily 
imposed its own interpretation of domestic law in the 2013 Del Rio Prada 
v. Spain367 judgment.  
6.4.6 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS ON THE NON-DEROGATORY RIGHTS 
Theoretically, the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
within the ECHR isn’t limited to any set of provisions but is practically 
unapplied for the four non-derogatory rights.368 The post-2011 case law 
                                                          
364 Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens to Stummer v. Austria (note 358). 
365 Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], Judgment of 18 July 2013, 
apps. nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, para. 66; Del Rio Prada v. Spain (note 99), para. 77.  
366 Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (note 365), para. 75. 
367 See Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Mahoney and Vehabovic to Del Rio Prada 
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368 J. CALLEWAERT (note 82), p. 6-9; ST. GREER (note 57) 2000, p. 6, 27.  
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generally confirms the ECtHR’s strict standards under the non-derogatory 
provisions and even contains some extensions of the protection afforded, 
such as in Article 3 ECHR (Vinter and Others v. UK369, Harakchiev and 
Tolumov v. Bulgaria370). However, one can notice the novel and 
innovatory application of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in the realm of the non-derogatory Articles 3 ECHR 
(M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium371) and 4 ECHR (Stummer v. Austria372). 
These two judgments might potentially be significantly influential and 
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The analysis of the ECtHR’s post-2011 judgments shows that the Court 
has changed its use of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine compared to its jurisprudence before 2011. Before 
2011 the margin of appreciation doctrine played only a marginal role in 
the field of the “due process rights”. After 2011 the ECtHR did not 
hesitate to deviate from established case law and to defer to the national 
authorities’ assessment in this field. With regard to “personal freedoms”, 
the ECtHR also pursued a strong degree of deference to the national 
authorities and carefully avoided to challenge their decisions. As a 
consequence, the Court overturned formerly absolute rules373 and 
weakened the protection in the field of fundamental guarantees such as 
the right to liberty374 as well as the freedom of religion375 and freedom of 
expression.376 Taken together, this new approach is very much in line with 
the demands voiced at the three High Level Conferences. 
Notwithstanding this trend to granting more discretion to national 
authorities in these two areas, the ECtHR limited the national discretion 
in a few cases.377 This was specially the case in the Bayatyan v. 
Armenia378 judgment where the ECtHR recognised a right to 
conscientious objection because of the European consensus in the matter.  
Regarding the “non-derogatory rights”, the principle of subsidiarity seems 
to have gained relevance. The implications of M.S.S. v. Greece and 
Belgium379, where the ECtHR demonstrated more deference to national 
authorities to the detriment of the protection of individual rights without 
further explanations are potentially worrying. In the Stummer v. Austria380 
                                                          
373 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom (note 185). 
374 Austin and Others v. The United Kingdom (note 115). 
375 S.A.S. v. France (note 244). 
376 Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom (note 268); Mouvement Raëlien 
Suisse v. Switzerland (note 276).  
377 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (note 176); Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine 
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judgment the ECtHR gave more weight to the national authorities’ 
discretion than to the applicant’s protection under Art. 4 ECHR. In 
addition, the ECtHR chose not to adapt the interpretation of this provision 
to present day conditions, which rendered its protection ineffective. 
However, in the majority of the “non-derogatory rights” cases after 2011, 
the ECtHR upheld its high standards and has even somewhat extended the 
protection afforded by them.381 This was also the case in the field of the 
“prohibition of discrimination”.382 
Summing up, one can conclude that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence regarding 
the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine has 
undergone important changes since its foundation. Applying a very 
cautious approach in the beginning, the ECtHR started to interpret the 
ECHR more and more as a living instrument that needs to take into 
account present day conditions and emerging European consensuses by 
extending the protection in a number of fields. The demand for more 
subsidiarity voiced by some Contracting States can be seen as a legitimate 
call to order for the ECtHR to respect its fundamentally subsidiary role.383 
However, this call to order shouldn’t lead the ECtHR to hide behind and 
misuse the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine to avoid unwelcome interferences with the Contracting States. 
The post-2011 instrumentalisation of these two concepts, which has led 
to a diminishment of the protection of individual rights in certain cases is 
thereby particularly worrying for a Court that institutionalises the 
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L’IDHEAP en un coup d’œil 
Champ 
Intégré au 1er janvier 2014 dans la Faculté de droit, des sciences criminelles et 
d’administration publique, l’IDHEAP poursuit dans un environnement académique 
élargi et fertile ses missions d’enseignement dans les programmes de base, de 
formation continue, de recherche et d’expertise qui lui ont permis d’atteindre un 
rayonnement national et international. 
Ainsi recomposée, la Faculté de droit, des sciences criminelles et d’administration 
publique développe un profil totalement inédit en Suisse, propice aux échanges 
interdisciplinaires, dans la ligne adoptée de longue date par l’UNIL. 
L’IDHEAP se concentre sur l’étude de l’administration publique, un champ 
interdisciplinaire visant à développer les connaissances scientifiques sur la conduite 
des affaires publiques et la direction des institutions qui en sont responsables. Ces 
connaissances s’appuient sur plusieurs disciplines des sciences humaines et sociales, 
adaptées aux spécificités du secteur public et parapublic. L’IDHEAP est le seul institut 
universitaire suisse totalement dédié à cet important champ de la connaissance. 
Vision 
À l’interface entre théorie et pratique de l’administration publique, l’IDHEAP est le 
pôle national d’excellence contribuant à l’analyse des mutations du secteur public et à 
une meilleure gouvernance de l’Etat de droit à tous ses niveaux, en pleine coopération 
avec ses partenaires universitaires suisses et étrangers. 
Mission  
Au service des étudiants, du secteur public et de la société dans son ensemble, 
l’IDHEAP a une triple mission qui résulte de sa vision : 
 Enseignement universitaire au niveau master et post-master, ainsi que
formation continue de qualité des élus et cadres publics ;
 Recherche fondamentale et appliquée en administration publique
reconnue au niveau national et international, et valorisée dans le secteur
public suisse ;
 Expertise et conseil indépendants appréciés par les organismes publics
mandataires et enrichissant l’enseignement et la recherche.
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Principales prestations 
1. Enseignement : former les élus et cadres actuels et futurs du
secteur public
 Doctorat en administration publique
 MPA (Master of Advanced Studies in Public Administration-MPA)
 Master PMP (Master of Arts in Public Management and Policy)
 CEMAP (Certificat exécutif en management et action publique)
 CAS en administration publique avec spécialisation dans une douzaine de
domaines (Certificate of Advanced Studies in Public Administration)
 SSC (Séminaire pour spécialistes et cadres)
2. Recherche : ouvrir de nouveaux horizons pour l’administration
publique
 Projets de recherche fondamentale ou appliquée
 Direction de thèse de doctorat en administration publique
 Publications scientifiques (ouvrages et articles)
 Colloques et conférences scientifiques
 Cahiers et Working Papers de l’IDHEAP
3. Expertise et conseil : imaginer de mettre en œuvre des solutions
innovatrices
 Mandats d’expertise et de conseil auprès du secteur public et parapublic
4. Services à la cité : contribuer à la connaissance du service public
 Bibliothèque spécialisée en administration publique
 Sites badac.ch, gov.ch, ivote.ch
 Manuel de l’administration publique
 Renseignement aux collectivités publiques
 Interventions médiatiques
 Articles et conférences de vulgarisation
Ce mémoire analyse le développement et l’application actuelle du 
principe de subsidiarité et de la doctrine de la marge d’appréciation 
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme 
(CEDH).
La CEDH est actuellement soumise à un processus de réforme visant 
à assurer son efficacité à long terme et à surmonter sa crise de charge 
de travail. Pendant ce processus, les Etats Membres du Conseil de 
l’Europe se sont réunis lors de trois conférences de haut niveau à 
Interlaken, Izmir et Brighton où ils ont revendiqué le renforcement du 
principe de la subsidiarité et de la marge d’appréciation. Ce mémoire 
démontre, sur la base des jugements clés de la CEDH énoncés après 
2011, comment et dans quelle mesure la jurisprudence de la Cour a 
changé après la conférence d’Interlaken en 2010. 
This paper analyses the development and the current application 
of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case 
law.
The ECtHR is currently undergoing a reform process to ensure 
its long-term effectiveness and overcome a working-load crisis. 
During this reform process, the Member States of the Council of 
Europe met at three High-Level Conferences in Interlaken, Izmir 
and Brighton where they called for a strengthening of the principle 
of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine. This paper 
illustrates based on post-2011 ECtHR land-mark judgments how 
and to what extent the Court’s jurisprudence has changed after 
the Interlaken Conference in 2010.
